Sunday, September 25, 2011

The Storming of the Israeli occupation embassy

Arwa kindly translated my recent article in Al-Akhbar: 

"The Storming of the Embassy in the Building

As’ad Abu Khalil

To Habib Shartuni, wherever you are,
On your anniversary.

No qualms about it. We hate Israel (while disliking Amr Moussa and Husni Mubarak). We hate it immensely. No shame in admitting to that. Political spite is not only justified; it fuels fundamental change. Would the apartheid regime in South Africa have collapsed had Blacks not abhorred it? Zionist propaganda not only wants to crush armed resistance, but it depicts our hatred of it as a kind of racism per se, because racism is reserved for the white man (and the Israeli – the latter strives to model himself after the white man, ignoring Israel’s non-European population). The storming of the embassy was a television and internet moment.

Every calamity that befalls the enemy is an opportunity for us to celebrate as we await the greatest celebration, when the usurping entity falls. Who didn’t rejoice at the sight of the lowering of the flag, and the competition among the Egyptian uprising’s youth to climb the building? Who didn’t notice that the enemy’s building insisted on opening in a residential building (without the residents’ knowledge or input, of course, but this was decided by the Sadat-Mubarak regime) in order to use the residents as human shields? The enemy’s embassy used the building’s residents as human shields, to guarantee it would never experience an explosion or a fire. The Egyptian government should’ve required the Israeli embassy to move elsewhere, where it would be accessible to protesters. The enemy’s embassy wants to enjoy the government’s protection and that of civilians, who are forced to bear the burden of sharing space with the enemy’s outpost in Egypt. Jubilation and congratulations about the storming of the embassy spread on Facebook and Twitter. It might be a watershed moment in the Egyptian uprising’s history. We may say “after the storming of the embassy, not before.” This has destroyed the Zionists’ dreams of peaceful coexistence with the Egyptian uprising’s outcome.

Husni Mubarak’s era represented a depraved time on all fronts including cultural production. There is a brand of art, known in Egypt as “degraded” art, that flourishes only in a degraded era like that of Sadat and  Mubarak. Compare that to Abdul Naser’s era, who was soley accused tyranny by the House of Saud. That doesn’t mean the Mubarak-Sadat era was absolutely devoid of good art. But the art that gained international recognition (in the arts and literature) was decadent. Adel Imam was an opportunist, one of the final products of the Jamal Mubarak era that never began; Imam was a Nasserite during Nasserism, a Sadatite during Sadat’s government and a supporter of Mubarak during Mubarak’s era. In his movie “Al-Safara fi Al-‘imara” (The Embassy in the Building) embodied Mubarak’s obsolete values (which still haven’t ended due to SCAF rule). The movie sought to trivialize most Arabs’ political principles (with the exception of the House of Saud’s lackeys who write in the publications of … the House of Saud). The movie tries to depict the generation of hostility towards Israel (as if that generation ended in the sixties) one that deserves ridicule. In the movie, the “protagonist’s” sexual instincts become more important than rejection of Israel. The position towards Israel’s aggression becomes a mere debatable viewpoint.

This week’s scenes of the Israeli occupation embassy’ storming inflamed the new online Arab generation. I followed it online and was relieved that the new Arab generation holds no less animosity towards Israel than its predecessors whenever the opportunity to express itself arose, and whenever the nightmare receded (this is Altantawi, the US and Israel’s dilemma in Egypt. The fear factor has disappeared, and nobody can succeed Omar Suleiman’s filthy acts, internally and externally despite the fact that the revolution has not yet ripened). Israel has secretly known the Arab world’s concealed opinions. It knew that its interests coincide only with tyrannical regimes like Sadat and Mubarak’s. The pictures from embassy were exhilarating. An Egyptian protester was sending me pictures from the site via her own phone (she holds a PhD from Oxford, and I say this only because western media has tried to depict the protesters as Mubarak’s hooligans. Politically and sexually sleazy website Elaph spread the idea that the protesters were paid by Jamal Mubarak’s cronies). Egyptian indignation towards the enemy’s embassy has several meanings: it conveys not only traditional Arab anger towards the usurping entity but it also expresses a new Arab awareness. The Arab people have become aware that Israel is Arab tyrants’ natural ally in our area while it simultaneously boasts of its own democracy (it is democratic for Jews only, and there is racism amongst Jews themselves, in the same fashion as the apartheid regime in South Africa before it crumbled). The truth about Israel’s support for repressive regimes from Morocco to Saudi Arabia was concealed from most Arabs (including military, intelligence and sometimes economic support. Let’s not forget Mauritania’s drive to normalize with Israel). All this was exposed over the last few months when the deceptive Israeli government concealed its true sentiments towards Husni Mubarak. Israel will soon regret, if it hasn’t already regretted, making its affinity with Mubarak publicly before and after his downfall. That is, it has implicitly included anti-Israeli feelings in the new definition of Egyptian citizenship. The Egyptian people have understood the trick, and they have realized that Israel and Saudi Arabia clung desperately to Mubarak’s regime to the very last minute and beyond. This explains the Egyptian masses’ approach of both the Israeli embassy and the Saudi embassy (though the Saudi embassy enjoys strong protection from SCAF, which receives Saudi money). All Arab media, and most western media, ignored the Egyptian masses’ march to the Saudi embassy because the simultaneous animosity to Israel and the House of Saud is embarrassing.

The embassy does not only represent Zionist penetration into the Arab world and an attempt to quell categorical rejection of Israel as per the no’s of Khartoum. The embassy’s large crew does (not) conceal its espionage and terrorist intentions as well as psychological warfare forcing the Arab people to accept the idea of peace with Israel; a concept supported by Husni Mubarak’s family and a a few Egyptian writers in Saudi newspapers. The Israeli embassy in Cairo is a point of penetration Arab societies as well as a nerve center for espionage operations in Egypt and other Arab countries. The Camp David regime crumbled before the Egyptian uprising completely expelled the Israeli presence from Egypt. Liberals still try to impose limitations on the discourse surrounding Camp David: it demands nothing more than amendment of Camp David’s stipulations in order to mobilize Egyptian troops in the Sinai, as Walid Junblat opined. That is, Egyptian liberals’ goal is to increase Israel’s security provided by the Egyptian army.

The details of the attack on the Israeli embassy reveal much about the essence of the ruling regime in Egypt and about Israel’s strategic status. It appears that six armed security personnel were trapped inside the embassy, or inside a bathroom, or on the rooftops, fearing the people’s wrath. Israeli press that Netanyahu and Barak called “field marshal” – what a funny title for officers who led armies to defeat; the title is better suited for south Lebanon’s youth in 2006, who deserve the title – Tantawi more than once but he refused to talk to them. When Netanyahu and his staff gave up on trying to reach Tantawi the enemy’s leaders contacted Obama and the US Secretary of Defense (and the head of Egyptian intelligence, who promptly responded to the enemy). The US Secretary of Defense tried for two hours to reach Tantawi, to no avail, he finally managed to deliver a direct threat to the Egyptian regime. This conveys the enemy’s strategic crisis: this is the Zionist state that has enjoyed a tremendous amount of aid from the US, Germany and other countries as well as monstrous western arms without the humiliating conditions imposed on Gulf regimes, which are meant to boost western economies. Despite that, the Zionist state found itself in a weak, helpless position. When the people revolt the enemy’s arsenal disappears even nuclear weapons. This was a lesson the Shah, the apartheid regime in South Africa and Husni Mubarak’s regime learned. Israel, which used to send its terrorist planes around the world to rescue a single Israel individual, calls out for help from the American administration so it commands Field Marshal Tantawi to stop the spontaneous attack on the embassy. Israel could do nothing but wait and arrange for the escape of the terrorists within (they may have dressed as farmers, as some newspapers reported). The Israeli prime minister may have allowed the embassy’s security to fire on the Egyptian masses, and they did, but SCAF certainly censored this news (there may be an American propaganda movie soon “starring” the enemy’s terrorists and depicting the Egyptian protesters’ “savagery.”)

We can use this event to extrapolate the short term future. The enemy’s media was terrified. Israel’s international isolation has increased along with Arab people’s anger. Fighter jets that had defeated Arab regimes’ armies in the past have become useless. There is confusion in the enemy’s ranks towards the embassy crisis. The enemy’s media worked to cover up the embarrassment and the people’s rage. Israel was in no position to face that kind of reaction, a few months after the overthrow of its dear Mubarak (even American liberal writer Richard Cohen, who writes for the Washington Post, wrote a letter reminiscing about Husni Mubarak after the embassy attack). Israel’s leaders discovered that the era of Camp David supports Zionism but it’s suffers severe weakness (it is incorrect to assume Camp David is a bilateral agreement, especially since it involves several military and secret intelligence provisions that the US inserted – just ask Nabil Al-Arabi). This weakness lies in the States’ ability to secure a pro-American, tyrannical regime. Consecutive American administrations since 1979 performed their duties and flooded the Sadat-Mubarak regime with military and intelligence support. But the people’s anger is greater, as we saw. To advance its own hegemony in the area and protect Israel’s interests, the US made Mubarak’s family a Pharoah dynasty. Jamal Mubarak was prepared for his position via coordination between his father’s government and the Bush administration. American media used to race to meet Jamal Mubarak as if he were the wise man of the Nile. Obama clung on to Mubarak until the last minute. And when it became clear that Mubarak could no longer continue in power Obama tried to appease Israel with Omar Soleiman, but this also failed. Omar Soleiman’s role was the Obama’s administration last choice to extend Mubarak’s era.

Arab treatment of the scenes of the embassy attack sufficed to bring the House of Saud’s lackeys out of the woodworks to come to Israel’s rescue. Ali Salim, who calls for normalizing with Israel (who sees no contradiction in normalizing and expressing hostility to Jews as Jews in Arabic media. But aren’t all Israel’s friends in the Arab world anti-Jewish?) played the same old Saudi media broken record: the tune of warning against chaos and wars after the fall of Mubarak. Since Mubarak’s overthrow Prince Salman’s newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, has been rife with articles and pictures warning again chaos if Mubarak were to fall and they published sleazy articles about Iranian and Hamas conspiracies to overthrow him. The editor of this newspaper, who is one of the loudest Likudnik voices among the ranks of the House of Saud’s writers, equated the burning of the embassy with the burning of Egypt. Even Walid Junblat (who returned from Libya praising the new regime just like he used to praise Qadhafi – but this time he took with him an oil expert) expressed his opinion about Camp David as harming the “civility” of the Egyptian revolt. Speaking about civility and killing with axes, is anyone more informed about that than Walid Junblat? The House of Saud’s press chose, for reasons ordinary human intelligence cannot fathom, to play the role of a guardian to democratic uprisings in the Arab world. The House of Saud’s lackeys may be confused: perhaps beheading in Riyadh’s public squares are the ideal democratic model.

The advancement, not regression, of the Egyptian uprising to the level of revolution will result in an immediate distinction between fundamental, revolutionary change and liberal change. Of course, Islamists have their own calculations according to the Qatari or Saudi governments, or both these days. Islamists (Ikhwan and Salafists) stayed away from the storming of the embassy. They actually condemned it. Jihad is resisting Abdulnaser because the Ikhwan were in a regional-global alliance that includes the Israeli enemy. But the Cold War is in the past now, albeit it is clearer why Abdulnaser opposed the Ikhwan. The liberal wing in Egypt rushed to strongly denounce the storming of the embassy. Since when were revolutions liberal? Is there a revolution in history that was created by liberals? Liberals do not sully their hands with revolutions: they just try to reap their rewards during their appealing phases, but they flee once it turns into a revolution.

The website “We are all Khaled Said,” on Google’s behalf, which secretly assured the Israeli government it would block search results of Israel’s maps in a way that only Mossad directors and Google know about – the website quickly commented on the embassy storming and described it as “amateur.” Wael Ghonem, the Egyptian uprising’s accepted face for the white man because he works in an accepted company and because he says nothing against Mubarak’s American sponsor. He also has no position against Israel) commented on Twitter denouncing the storming of the embassy. Yediot Ahronot promptly quoted Wael Ghonem as the sole representative of the uprising of millions of Egyptians. While it is true that Ghonem returned to demand the Egyptian government to take a “strong” stance after the killing of the sixth Egyptian soldier on the hands of the enemy, but a strong stance is defined by liberals as kissing the enemy’s cheeks no more than three times during formal meetings. Arab liberalism  shares some features (we shouldn’t confuse Egypt’s independent liberals with those liberals who write for the princes of Saud). All forms of Arab liberalism suffer the white man complex: they try to appease him in every way possible, especially with regard to his stance towards Israel. Popular anti-Israeli sentiment embarrasses Arab liberals because they embrace the white man (who is a Zionist) and they constantly try to prove their civility. For this reason liberals’ comment on the storming of the embassy was to stress the importance of the revolution’s peacefulness and civility.

Revolutions were never “civil.” There was no civility in any global revolts that are considered beacons for humanity, such as the French revolution. Robespierre gave no attention to the charges leveled against him accusing him of terrorism (if Robespierre were alive today the US would’ve thrown him in Guantanamo in a heartbeat). Robespierre would tell them: if I were a terrorist, you would be at my feet. How could violence towards a concrete wall (built b the enemy on Egyptian soil, with permission from Tantawi’s council) be considered violence? We’ve been told for years that the definition of terrorism according to Zionism is any violence committed against any Israel even if he were a heavily armed terrorist soldier, which would then result in a United Nations resolution. But how is the demolition of a wall considered terrorism? Also, why does the storming of the enemy’s embassy cause more noise than the Israeli terrorist soldiers’ killing of Egyptian soldiers and Egyptian civilians? Liberalism may latch on to revolutions but they do not create them. The distinction between liberals and revolutionaries is inevitable and it may have been set in motion. As Amin Rihani described this phase [in his poem "Revolution"] in “The Valleys’ Chant”: Haven’t we told them the stories of Paris / when the Bastille was smashed, and the prisoners serenaded / when the king was beheaded / and the necks of top French people were cut.”"