A comrade who wishes to remain anonymous (for reasons that I don't understand--is he/she afraid of Turkish wrath?) sent me this: "A quick follow up on your counter revolution and the MB post. I believe that
sectarianism is not being masked even for the sake of politeness and diplomacy. If you look across the map in the Middle East, you'll notice that the Turkish Islamists (whom you always rightly distrusted) are leading a whole sale initiative whereby they market the different Arab branches of the MB as possible allies to the West who can protect western interests -economically and politically - while at the same time keep the masses happy with "Islamic" rhetoric that gratifies some basic religious/sectarian/fanatic instincts within those wretched societies. I think this provides an explanation for at least five major political shifts: the Qatari turn against Syria while maintaining a laudatory tone towards Turkey, the Hamas-Fatah rapprochement and its indications regarding Syria's regional stand, the Turkish sinister attitude towards Syrian developments, Turkey's role in Libya and the Saudi sudden abstinence from criticizing Turkey as they violently did in the aftermath of the flotilla incident. In Egypt, it is still unclear how the MB are cooperating with the Turkish government, but I do think that they will be the middle ground between Turkish and Saudi influence in the face of other secular nationalist and pan-Arab trends there. It is not the only factor of course, but it does provide answers to otherwise inexplicable moves and shifts."
sectarianism is not being masked even for the sake of politeness and diplomacy. If you look across the map in the Middle East, you'll notice that the Turkish Islamists (whom you always rightly distrusted) are leading a whole sale initiative whereby they market the different Arab branches of the MB as possible allies to the West who can protect western interests -economically and politically - while at the same time keep the masses happy with "Islamic" rhetoric that gratifies some basic religious/sectarian/fanatic instincts within those wretched societies. I think this provides an explanation for at least five major political shifts: the Qatari turn against Syria while maintaining a laudatory tone towards Turkey, the Hamas-Fatah rapprochement and its indications regarding Syria's regional stand, the Turkish sinister attitude towards Syrian developments, Turkey's role in Libya and the Saudi sudden abstinence from criticizing Turkey as they violently did in the aftermath of the flotilla incident. In Egypt, it is still unclear how the MB are cooperating with the Turkish government, but I do think that they will be the middle ground between Turkish and Saudi influence in the face of other secular nationalist and pan-Arab trends there. It is not the only factor of course, but it does provide answers to otherwise inexplicable moves and shifts."
