so according to this dude, the problems of the SNC are purely technical

"The SNC has done nothing of the sort. Its control over the Free Syrian Army and other armed opposition groups remains tenuous, sustained only by payments of cash but little else. Repeated attempts to bring the armed opposition under its political wing have failed because there is little trust in the SNC as a representative body. The resultant void in leadership has been filled byradical jihadist groups that have emerged as powerful challengers to the SNC.
Despite its claims to "serve as a political umbrella for the Syrian Revolution in the international arena," the SNC has yet to appoint a single delegate or spokesperson in any of the world's major capitals.
Competing factionalism within the SNC means that ponderous and ineffective delegations of twenty or more fly around the world at great expense because none of the constituent parties trust each other to sit with foreign governments alone. It should come as little surprise that no country apart from Libya recognizes the SNC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
Among the Syrian revolution's rank-and-file, the SNC appears distant and increasingly irrelevant. Despite access to at least seven satellite television channels and dozens of websites and YouTube channels, the SNC was neither able to appeal to its own core constituency (Sunni Arabs) or to develop sophisticated messages to engage with the minority groups on whose continued support Assad relies."

Haytham Al-Manna` criticizes the Syrian Natioanl Coalition

Akram kindly translated the article from As-Safir of the article by Haytham Al-Manna`:

"Following is the translation of the latest piece of Haytham Manna'a published in Assafir. Please revise before publishing [did not have time to revise, unfortunately].

During the last two month, anyone related, one way or another, to the SNC, were he being founder, resigned member, active member or promised to be member, was frequenting Doha in order to bring this body out of the intensive care unit after Dr. Eric Chevalier failed to do so alone. The collective photo of the SNC leadership with president Hollande and the financial and diplomatic support weren’t enough.

The pragmatic American way of thinking was more subtle by reformulating concepts presented by Ryiad Seif in a way suitable to the radical abandonment of the SNC. Hilary Clinton announced the expiry of this good and it was necessary to do a caesarian birth of a new born who is supposed to inherit the throne from his brother who failed to make use of the Gulf-Turkish-Western allegiance or to win the hearts and minds of the Syrian people or to develop a political rhetoric that keeps pace with the destructive violence in Syria.

Probably, the most important weakness of the passed SNC was his blind support of the militarization, and weaponizing armed groups which he failed to get them unified or to mature their political horizon.

We were encouraged by the speech of Sheikh Moa’ath al-Khatib who talked politics and religion rather that violence and weapons. But then we received horrible testimonies confirmed by a clear article in of the Syrian National Coalition. Mr. Khatib corrects deficiencies of his inaugural speech by expressing his desire to obtain European recognition and financial support to his coalition adding that, when the recognition is obtained, the coalition will act as government, will receive weapons, and thus all the problems will be resolved.

In a second letter published two days ago, Mr. Khatib unveils his opposition to the National Charter adopted in Cairo confirming that “the Cairo charter hasn’t been adopted in any way. I rejected, with many other brothers, this document and I issued a statement saying that, would anything contradicting the entrenched doctrine of Ummah be adopted, I will be the first to withdraw”.

What Mr. Kahtib was pointing at, is the deconsecration of the public domain given that human beings are responsible to their acts, and the equal citizenship between Syrians, two arguments rejected by some Islamists.

Despite the ambiguous relationship between the Council and the Coalition, and the relationship between the Arab League and the new project, and though the SNC has got the lion’s share (38 SNC members, 5 of them resigned) at the expense of the other present and absent factions, and regardless of the deliberate exclusion of Librahimi mission and Geneva conference, most of the Arab countries remained silent in the meeting of Cairo and tried to fix the scene. But as someone who was present there said: “They said what they wanted to say by ignoring us, and we said what we wanted to say in a non-binding way”.

France is giving another example of its cacophony towards Syria: the Defense Minister excludes the direct recognition, the foreign affairs delegate supports without recognition, while President Hollande says comically: “Today I announce that France recognizes the SNC as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and that it is the coming government of the democratic Syria that will put an end to the Bashar Assad regime”. No, it’s not a typo. President Hollande recognizes the SNC after being displaced, in a clear evidence on how thoroughly he follows the Syrian issue!

The ambiguities of the documents of Doha are many. Rejecting dialogue and negotiations doesn’t require a political body; it’s rather the fighters' mission. The problem is that there is someone who wants to dictate the Syrians what to do, forcing them to do what they want and what they don’t want, transforming them into flunkies, as Mr. Issam ‘Attar said.

Before Doha conference, Khatib said negotiating is a religious and political duty. But after living the Qatari generosity, he discovered he erred with this Fatwa and thus deserving one retribution only, while Ford and Chevalier deserve two."

Deadlock in Syria

"Syria’s opposition — or parts of it — are incapable of offering any serious guarantees for the future. Some of their earlier supporters have even turned away from the opposition. The Kurds, who were among the first to protest (to get national identity cards, which they had been denied), are now keeping their distance, shocked by the refusal of the Syrian National Council (SNC) to recognise their rights (4). The government has re-launched the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which it had already used in its military confrontations with Turkey in the 1990s and which remains popular among Syria’s Kurds.  There is a new split at the heart of the SNC, led by people such as Haytham al-Maleh and Kamal al-Labwani, former political prisoners who reject the SNC’s foreign alignment. Ammar Qurabi, the former head of Syria’s National Organisation for Human Rights and leader of the National Current for Change, has accused the SNC of marginalising Alawite and Turkmen activists (5). Syrian Christians, who have watched many Christians flee Iraq, are worried by the rise of the jihadists and the anti-Christian and anti-Alawite slogans chanted by protestors.  The SNC has many opponents, including the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, which rejects foreign military intervention. It has gone through a series of internal splits, and is now dominated by the Islamists, though it is fronted by a few liberal figures. Its dependence on western countries and Gulf monarchies has gone down badly.  The result is total deadlock. The opposition cannot bring down the government, and the government cannot put down an uprising that has a surprising determination and courage. It would be impossible to return to the status quo ante: the government could never maintain the control it used to have over a nation that has been politicised over the last few months. The government’s reforms (a new constitution, successive amnesties) are meaningless since the secret services and the army have a free hand to bomb, torture and kill opponents.  There is a real risk of civil war, which could spill into Lebanon and Iraq. Foreign military intervention would intensify sectarian fighting and make the gun the only arbiter of religious divisions. It could destroy hopes of democracy in the region." (thanks Bassam)

SNC

Akram sent me this: ""There was never any question of a national unity government led by a member of the regime," Bassma Kodmani told AFP, hours after another SNC spokesman, George Sabra, said the council was ready to agree to a transfer of President Bashar al-Assad's powers to a regime figure who would take power for a transitional period.
Sabra said on Tuesday that the SNC "would agree to the departure of Assad and the transfer of his powers to a regime figure, who would lead a transitional period like what happened in Yemen."

1. I urge the SNC fractions to unite their ranks
2. I'll call for an international meeting dedicated to unite the SNC fractions."

meet the Syrian exile opposition

""Sieda is the not real decision-maker," complained Khalaf Dawood of the NCB. "He and [predecessor Burhan] Ghalioun are just pawns. The Islamists control the SNC even though there is no democratic basis for that. The Turks and the Saudis are running things and the Americans might be behind them. We don't want to end up swapping one corrupt dictatorship for another."  SNC officials emphasise close co-ordination with the FSA, whose men now receive regular pay through the council. "The SNC want to create a war chest so they can bribe fighters on the ground because that's the only way they can have any leverage on the ground," said the Syrian commentator Malik al-Abdeh.  SNC leaders say they will shortly set up a base on Syrian soil like the Libyan rebels did in Benghazi. The SNC has also built up a database to keep foreign governments informed on the structure and activities of the FSA so weapons and money do not end up in the hands of Salafi or jihadi-type groups."

He is sad: the politics of the SNC

"The leadership of Syria's main opposition group in exile is an all-male affair after elections failed to promote a single woman to the decision-making group of 41 members.

Some of the female delegates at the Syrian National Council conference in the Qatari capital of Doha rushed the podium in protest after the results were announced in the early hours of Thursday. They said the new leadership fails to reflect the key role of women in the push to topple Syrian President Bashar Assad.

On at least this point, the SNC appeared to fall short in its attempt to showcase a new diversity in the face of international criticism that it is not representative enough of the whole spectrum of the opposition. After the vote by more than 400 members of the SNC's general assembly, the group tried to redress the lack of women in its new leadership. SNC chief Abdelbaset Sieda said he was "so sad" and would try to add four women to the general secretariat by decree."

Duplicity and the Syrian National Council

"Damascus regularly attributes a role to criminal gangs, domestic and foreign terrorist organizations, and international rivals such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in sustaining the FSA and the broader opposition movement. Concerns about radical Islamist influence within the FSA and the opposition were frequently conveyed to this author in discussions with Syrians living and working in Beirut, including many who sympathize with the demands of the opposition. FSA and SNC leaders categorically refute reports of radical Islamist influence within their ranks. .... In spite of their popular appeal among wide segments of Syrian society, the actions of the FSA and its SNC partner must also be considered in the context of the greater rivalry between the United States and its regional allies on one side and Iran and Syria on the other. ... Syria has fast emerged as a battleground for the wider currents angling to shape a new geopolitical map of the Middle East in their favor. ... Damascus believes that the FSA and its SNC partner are acting to shore up the position of the United States and its Gulf allies following the resilient displays of dissent in Egypt and other pro-U.S. authoritarian regimes, the perceived gains made by Iran in Iraq and the wider Gulf region, and the growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. .. On the surface, SNC head Ghalioun’s intention to steer Syria away from its strategic military relationships with Iran and Hezbollah in a post al-Assad scenario in favor of friendlier relations with Gulf countries appears to vindicate the Baathist regime’s claim that the FSA and the opposition in general have a duplicitous nature." (thanks Sara)

money, money, money

"The SNC claims to draw legitimacy from the Syrian people. In reality, it sources of legitimacy are external: Arab money and western recognition. For now, Arab money still flows into its coffers but the West has grown impatient and is looking for alternatives.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refused to meet an SNC delegation in Istanbul last month; she opted to meet with independent activists instead. Recent diplomatic activity points to an incipient consensus in London, Washington, and Paris that encouraging a credible alternative to Assad based around the SNC is a policy that has failed. And, that in turn, has prompted criticisms of the West from the SNC leadership."

Syria from Berlin: "last minute revolutionaries"

Joerg sent me this (I cite with his permission, of course):
"a few hours ago I sent you some small news about a new Syria conference here in Berlin. Here I added some small information:

Today there is again a huge international conference about Syria in Berlin.
50 delegations from all over the world will meet to discuss the reconstruction of the country after the fall of the Asad regime, the media announced.  The meeting is organised by the German foreign ministry, the V. A. E., and the "Friends of Syria".  Nevertheless the Syrian opposition seems to be mainly represented by the SNC.  German foreign minister Westerwelle declared that the Syrian opposition now should constitute a provisional government.  Last week, members of the Syrian opposition (also mainly SNC) already presented a paper called "The Day After".  For several months, they met at "Stiftung Wissenschaft & Politik", a German think tank affiliated to the government.  The US think tank USIP also participated in organising these meetings.  The aim was obviously - against all different statement - to promote a military intervention, and market economy (and of course to strengthen the German influence).  In an interview with the leftist newspaper "Neues Deutschland", Haitham al Manna declared yesterday, that the Berlin meetings are not representative for the Syrian opposition, and the declarations of the conferences and published papers are of no importance or value at all. He called the Syrian participants "last minute revolutionaries", who did not want to sign petitions, or join political rallies, when they still were in Syria.

I do not know whether these are important news, but here it is in the radio since 7.30 am. (There was maybe one new idea, that the "revolutionaries" of the SNC should retire and constitute a "Council of Elders", while the younger people in Syria, who protested themselves, should come to power after the fall of the Asad regime; but I only heard of this idea in a non-official meeting with some SNC members two weeks ago)".

Angry Arab interviews Aron Lund on Syrian opposition groups

I don't agree with Aron Lund (a Swedish journalist specializing in Middle East issues) on Syria: we approach the situation differently and we derive different conclusions.  But I respect Aron's knowledge: I regard him as the most knowledgeable observer and analyst of the Syrian opposition there is.  So I sent him yesterday a series of questions asking for his answers to publish on this blog for the infrequent interview section of the blog.  Here are my questions and his answers:  I post without, of course, agreeing with him on everything (and without editing):

Q and A

1) Was the Syrian regime, in hindsight, lying when it claimed right after the launch of the uprising, that there were armed groups operating in Syria? And were the armed groups lying when they later claimed that they were strictly peaceful but turned violent by virtue of the violence of the regime?

As far as I can tell, the Syrian uprising was overwhelmingly peaceful for most of 2011. There was of course a fair bit of stone-throwing and rioting, and there seems to have been some organized attacks on government forces in early 2011 (like the violence in Baniyas in April, revenge attacks on government forces in Deraa, some trouble north of on the Lebanese border, and so on). But these things were very rare until the summer, and they generally did not seem to be connected to the main political movement, which was one of demonstrations and peaceful activism. Recall that one of the most popular slogans of the revolution was ”silmiye, silmiye” (”peaceful, peaceful”). That was the mainstream opposition discourse, which people believed in, demonstrated for, and were killed for.

So, bottom line: The government was telling the truth in some instances, but it was also clearly lying when it tried to portray the reolution as such as the work of ”armed gangs”. For every armed attack on the government in those early days, Assad’s forces had gunned down about a hundred peaceful demonstrators, yet the government media only mentioned the armed attack. Later of course, things began to change.

As for the armed movement in Syria, there was certainly some small groups who had their sights set on armed action from the start, like the jihadis. I’m sure they did their best to fan the flames, but they were pretty insignificant at first.

Most of the opposition kept calling for peaceful protest well into late summer 2011. The vast mass of the armed insurgency still today seems to consist of ordinary Syrian civilians who joined it when the fighting came to their towns, former demonstrators who picked up guns, pro-Assad soldiers who deserted, people who had relatives killed, etc. So I really think the violence of the regime was the number one driver for Syria’s civil war, along with the (related) surge in sectarianism.

2) was there a Western and Arab media cover up when the total control by Muslim Brotherhood of Syrian NActional Council conclealed?

First of all, I don’t think there was ever total control over the SNC by the Muslim Brotherhood, it was much more complex than that. They were by far the most powerful group in the SNC, but often they seemed to be almost as frustrated by it as everyone else. People have underestimated the fractiousness of the Syrian exile opposition. Many smaller groups (Islamists and non-Islamists) tried to hitch a ride on the Ikhwani bandwagon for reasons of their own. This strengthened the Ikhwan, but it didn’t mean that they could control all these groups.

Their power was basically because of clever alliance-building and picking strategic offices, but they had to work hard to keep those alliances alive, and there were setbacks from time to time. With the formation of the National Coalition, I think the Ikhwan have been cut down to size. They’re reasonably well represented, but nowhere near as powerful as in the SNC. We’ll see how they’re going deal with that.

On Western/Arab media: Not so much a cover-up as a case of shallow reporting (although I realize there’s only so much you can do with a 500-word article). The prominent role of the Brotherhood in the exile community was either not discussed at all, or presented in very alarmist tones, in the ”stealth jihadis control the entire opposition” kind of writing. And with all due respect, I think your blog has been engaging in some of that.

3) was the notion of an uprising led by Suhayr Atasi and other liberals and feminists a mere propaganda ploy?

This is a bit of a straw man argument, isn’t it? I agree that liberal dissidents (or more precisely: Anglophone exile dissidents, who were also often liberals) got a disproportional amount of attention at first – again mostly due to lazy reporting. But no one who was seriously interested in the conflict could have imagined that the opposition was all pro-Western liberals and feminists. If you look at the socioeconomics of the revolutionary movement, it was basically a populist grassroots resistance which emerged from the impoverished Sunni Arab countryside and poor neighborhoods in the cities. Not really a bastion of secular liberalism.

Then, of course, you had intellectuals, student groups, media activists, and old-school dissidents who helped set off the initial demonstrations, mobilize the media, shape the early revolutionary discourse and so on. Many of them were secular, although I think more often of the far-left variety than liberals. Soheir el-Atassi certainly played an important role there. Their role has diminshed since then, and they’re unfortunately quite marginal now that the conflict is in the hands of armed rebels.

4) Is there in your mind any unit or battallion fighting in Syria that is really secular and or liberal?

Well, on the government side there seems to be plenty of them. The Kurdish YPG militias, loyal to the PKK, are also quite serious about secularism. In the Arab armed opposition movement, I’m not aware of any really secular group, but of course there could be some small factions. As far as I can tell, virtually all of the major armed groups (Liwa el-Tawhid, Kataeb el-Farouq, Ahrar el-Sham, Jabhat al-Nosra, Suqour el-Sham, Ansar el-Islam, etc) have by now declared that they want an Islamic state.

Then again, it depends on how you define secular and liberal. Syrian society hasn’t been very secular or liberal in general, despite the Baath Party’s enforced state secularism. Outside of the urban middle/upper class and intellectual strata, people of all faiths have tended to be deeply religious and conservative, even in times of peace and (not so much under the Assads) prosperity. That’s going to be reflected in the opposition as well, particularly since the war has now gone sectarian.

On a side note, I often think it’s helpful to try to distinguish between religiousness (in terms of personal faith) and sectarianism (as loyalty to a religiously defined community). Some groups who publicly and perhaps even privately identify with secular politics, can still act in extremely sectarian ways. Recall how Hafez el-Assad systematically played the sectarian card and used the Alawite community to bolster his regime, and yet he never showed even a hint of sincere religiousness.

5) When we speak of secular among the armed groups in Syria, is that like we we use secular to denote non-Islamists in Afghanistan like Abdul-Rashid Dustum?

Yes, kind of. At least I get the impression that that’s how the word is being used in the media: as a catch-all term for ”non-Islamist”.

You could also compare with Fatah and Hamas during the latest Palestinan uprising. Certainly they differ ideologically as political movements, but during the intifada, the lines were quite blurred since everybody employed religious rhetoric. For example, who was more secular, the Aqsa Martyrs suicide bomber or the Ezzeddin el-Qassam suicide bomber?

Bottom line, I’m not sure it’s a very useful term in this context.

6) Do you think that the unconditional support granted by Western governments and media helped in pushing the Syrian conflict into a civil war? 

There was no unconditional support for the uprising (except verbally), and there was generally no desire to see a Syrian civil war in the West. To the contrary, there was great fear that Syria would implode the way it has now done. I don’t even think the Gulf monarchies had the stomach for that at first. It was only after the slide to civil war had become a near certainty that most Western and Gulf governments went all-in on the rebel side, after having been cautiously supportive at first, and meddling half-heartedly with the exile opposition. Remember that it took the US-EU-GCC bloc until July-August 2011 to even demand the resignation of Bashar el-Assad.

In sum, I think Western governments helped fan the flames to some extent, but not as part of a systematic strategy – rather a lack of strategy. When they figured out what was going on, it was too late to change course anyway. Since then, it’s changed completely, and now several Western nations are intimately involved with the uprising.

In my view, the international involvement has been disastrous for Syria – and I’m referring both to the US/EU/GCC side and the Russian/Iranian/Chinese support for Assad. Both blocs seem perfectly content with seeing Syria torn to shreds, as long as they can make sure that their opponents don’t get what they want. It’s now going to be very difficult to disentangle the Syrian civil war from other intractable regional and international conflicts.

7) If Syria is in a state of civil war, does that mean that the armed groups—just like the regime—have failed to win the support of the majority of people?

Nobody’s conducted a poll, but yeah, I imagine so. I have no idea what the percentages are, but clearly, both sides have strong support from within different communities, while many others are just sick of it all. Imagining the Syrian people (or any people) as a single entity which can be neatly divided into X% For and Y% Against isn’t helping us to understand what is going on. There are socioeconomic factors, regional issues, sectarian and ethnic divides, lots of political baggage, etc, and all of these things play out differently in their own local contexts.

Certain rebel groups draw support from certain segments of the population. For example, Liwa el-Tawhid is strong around Aleppo, and presumably has some sort of a popular/resource base there, while Liwa el-Haqq is strong in the old town of Homs, Liwa el-Islam has struck roots in the eastern Ghouta, and so on.

The same is basically true for Bashar el-Assad’s government. Behind the Baath Party, there’s always been kind of an alliance of different interests – powerful families, military networks, clans and tribes, wealthy financiers, etc. If (or when) the government side starts fragmenting, I think the regime’s umbrella structure will become more clearly visible.

8) Jabhat An-Nusrah: how many variants of it exist among the armed groups? 

Only one Jabhat el-Nosra, if by that you refer to a large al-Qaida franchise. You also have some radical groups of Syrians and foreign fighters who seem to share the same basic salafi-jihadi ideology (like Kataeb el-Muhajerin or the Mujahedin Shoura Council), but they’re tiny by comparison.

Then you have other Islamist groups who are also ultraconservative and Sunni-sectarian, but more connected to mainstream salafi thinking in the Gulf etc, and not specifically to the salafi-jihadi criminal undergound. They don’t seem to be linked to al-Qaida in the same fashion either, and try to distance themselves a little from the most radical jihadi stuff. These factions include Ahrar el-Sham and the other factions within the Syrian Islamic Front."

Meet the GCC-sponsored Syrian opposition

"But even with much coaxing from Western powers, products of the uprising such as the Syrian National Council (SNC) and a rival group, the National Co-ordination Body (NCB), have gained little diplomatic traction. Neither do they have much influence in Syria, where local committees organise resistance. The two main opposition groupings have bickered over strategy, as the NCB at first counselled dialogue with the state and the SNC backed foreign intervention. In fact, neither course has proved fruitful. Some Syrians suspect the Muslim Brotherhood of being too powerful within the SNC, whereas others say it is a tool of America. Even the head of the Free Syrian Army has complained that the exiled opposition groups are dominated by plotters and traitors."

Critique of Syrian National Council: from Jadaliyya

Comrade Bassam wants me to put a link to a word of that long interview daily, and I am obliging under duress. Here is yet another section of the interview:  "The Deliberated Istanbul Project 

(Themes and Paraphrased Segments from the Interview--Not for attribution)

There were parties to the conflict who wanted to create an opposition "project" with small players.  The make-up, preparation, and imposition of leadership did not proceed according to the real representative democratic formula. But nearly all external actors supported this formula. This was the end of the possibility of unity among the opposition.  The discourse and machinations of the SNC increasingly resembled those of the regime. If you wanted to remain independent, you could not join the SNC.  The leader of the Free Syrian Army was beholden to the declarations and positions of Turkish intelligence.  I don't have the right to accuse the SNC of being traitors or agents, but i do have the right to say that their political decision was compromised by their political funding and alliances. Their discourse tried to appease the West and Israel . . . every other word they attack HIzballah, and Iran, to demonstrate good will to the West.  My mission is neither to attack nor to glorify Hizballah. My mission is to glorify democracy and win the democratic battle that will change both Syria and Lebanon.""

Ikhwan coup in the Syrian National Council

From early on, here and on panels on US colleges, I have argued that the Muslim Brotherhood controls the Syrian National Council.  Propagandists for the SNC were arguing that no, feminist women were in control of the SNC--kid you not.  Read here about the latest coup in the SNC.

SNC and armament

From Akram:  "For Abdelbaset Sieda, the president of the Syrian National Council (SNC), the armed presence (of the PYD party) in the Kurdish areas is questionable because problems can be solved through dialog and understanding away from the arm language, while igniting a sectarian war (with active participation of the Syrian regime) in the other parts of the country and shredding the Syrian community is understandable because there is no room, there, for understanding and dialog in solving problems (Arabic)".

A Syrina "revolutionary" at Cornell

From a reader:  "I am a student at Cornell University and avid reader. Last night, the Cornell Republicans brought Muna Jondy to talk at an event called 'Syrian Revolution: Dynamics of an International Crisis.' This woman was born in the US to a Syrian who fled the country in 1964. She is now deeply involved in the SNC. She told us she had been to Syria for the first time in 2007. Her talk was chock full of Orientalist tropes: Syrians want to have the same lives as Americans, if we help the rebels, Syrians (and the rest of the Middle East) will love the US, etc. She also said that Hezbollah is in control of a huge swath of Syria from the border with Lebanon to Hama and that the government's forces are only Alawites, Iranians, Hezbollah, and Russians with all other Syrians backing the rebels. Knowing just a sliver of truth from reading about events in Syria, I asked her in the Q&A about videos that show mob violence against Alawites for being 'shabbiha' and FSA kidnappings like that of the archbishops and I expressed by deep concern that the rebels are stoking sectarian tensions that could reignite Lebanon. She said that the archbishops had been captured by Russian mercenaries fighting for Assad. She also said that its the government that is stoking sectarian tensions because, she literally said this, "every general, every officer in the army is Alawi except the defense minister who is Christian and everyone knows his words mean nothing." She went on to say that the FSA doesn't deny when its troops commit atrocities because such things happen in war and that the sectarian violence will only get worse unless the US intervenes. She said that in a way that at least to me sounded more like a threat than concern about Syria. I don't know if the SNC is making some push to reach out to college campuses but I thought people should know that this happened. If reaching out to students was their objective, it was a mistake to co-sponsor with the Cornell Republicans; they are a tiny group and were only about half the audience of 15.  She also added how grateful she was to Israel intervening to destroy the arms convoy to Hezbollah.Here is a link to the event page:"

Ikhwan and Aljazeera: the love affair

"Al Jazeera Arabic’s love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood was evident from the channel’s beginning. Its chief religious program’s main guest is none other than Yusuf Al Qaradawi, a long-time Muslim Brotherhood member and resident of Qatar who has taken that state’s citizenship.
Since the Muslim Brotherhood decided to run a candidate, the channel has spared no effort in promoting the candidate through its various channels. Al Jazeera’s management showed great foresight when, mere days after the fall of Mubarak, it launched Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr, a channel dedicated to Egypt 24/7 that by the account of a close Egyptian friend and an astute observer of Egyptian media, has been dedicating its coverage in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood around the clock.
This relationship is mutually beneficial, of course. Due to its blatant bias toward the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jazeera has gotten to host some of the most influential political actors in Egypt, such as Khairet El Shater, the deputy supreme guide of the group on multiple occasions. Ahmed Mansour, Al Jazeera Arabic’s star anchor and Muslim Brotherhood member was rewarded with several interviews with not only Khairet El Shater, but also General Guide Mohammed Badie and Mohammed Morsi. The Brotherhood also appreciates this relationship and even bizarrely extends official congratulations and “support” to Al Jazeera on significant occasions. When Morsi’s office wanted to kill the story of what seemed to be a fabricated Iran news-agency interview with the president, it knew exactly who to call...In fact, Al Jazeera Arabic’s love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood has done damage to more than one country’s revolutionary cause. In Syria, Al Jazeera Arabic’s championing of the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated and highly ineffective opposition Syrian National Council has cost the channel much credibility. Al Jazeera Arabic refrains from criticising the group or highlighting its repeated failures. It also instructs its reporters to follow a certain narrative, prompting numerous resignations.
Simultaneously, the channel continues to host clownish supporters of the brutal Al Assad regime in order to give its viewers a certain impression. The Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar uncovered that the channel’s bias toward the SNC is due to it having assigned the “Syrian desk” to Ahmad al-Abda, who goes by the name Ahmed Ibrahim in order to hide his link to his brother Anas Al Abda, a Muslim Brotherhood member of the SNC. One Arab source within the channel confirmed this to me in a private Twitter message. Similarly, in Palestine, Al Jazeera Arabic scores major coups in uncovering the rampant corruption of the Palestinian Authority but neglects to mention democratic setbacks in the Hamas Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Gaza strip." (thanks Sultan)

House of Saud's columnists

Akram sent me this:  "Here is how Abdelwahab Badrakhan explains in Al-hayat newspaper (Arabic) why the efforts to unify the Syrian opposition groups (under the umbrella of the SNC off course) have failed:

"Actually, the "Body" (National Coordination Body for Democratic Change) and the Kurdish Council cannot, under any circumstances, join the Council (SNC). First of all, because it's been labeled as the «Council of Istanbul», which means that allying with him is equivalent of a clear challenge to the regime. Second, because the "Body" activates within the inside (Syria) roof, with the regime controlling its activities, turning blind eyes on its high tone rhetoric. And third because the Kurds ask the Council to provide an instant approval of the "right of self-determination" which embraces the idea of separating from Syria towards the mother Kurdish homeland, something which they haven't asked and will never ask the regime for"
2 remarks:

Each time the writer mentions the "National Coordination Body for Democratic Change" from the original text he uses double quotation. This may remind us of quoting the word Israel in some Arab newspapers... It was easier for Mr. Badrakhan to use the term "the so-called".

1. According to Mr. Badrakhan, Any delay in joining Council is incomprehensible and unforgivable and requires the researchers to unveil the real reasons behind it..
2. Working from inside Syria seems to be undesirable or even unpatriotic.... The real opposition is the one that works outside Syria and in full collaboration with the Americans and the Saudis...

The article is full of rubbish...but I only mentioned this paragraph".

PS What is hilarious is that Badrakan last time I saw him in DC in 2008, he was closely aligned with Qatar against Saudi Arabia.  He later switched, or went back to working for Saudi Arabia's media after the project that he was promised by Qatar (editing an Arab newspaper) did not come through.  

Ghalyun and Shaqfah Council

Comrade Bassam in Jadaliyyah (and he was kind to Ghalyun):  "Moreover, Ghalyoun states above that the SNC is “banking” on the “western powers” to help reclaim the Golan, presumably through international law and diplomacy. Really, Burhan? If a student of yours wrote this in a paper you’d probably get an eye infection reading it. Since when did anyone with an ounce of historical knowledge rely on western powers to respect international law and human rights when it comes to the Middle East, and Israel in particular? When it comes to international law or the United Nations and Israel, the United States behaved like a rogue state for decades, vetoing dozens of UN resolutions against Israel’s international law and human rights violations. Germany is now subsidizing the sale of nuclear-head capable submarines to Israel for nukes that Israel supposedly does not have, while Israel is in constant violation of nearly every important human value possible. You expect these decades-long law- and rights-crushing actors suddenly to help Burhan Ghlioun’s SNC restore the occupied Golan Heights, and, mind you, “as fast as possible?” It's like expecting the Taliban to push a feminist agenda in Tora Bora, or Israel to treat its non-Jewish citizens equally, or Saudi Arabia to enforce freedom from religion."

Hadi Al-Bahrah: House of Saud picks a new head of Syrian National Coalition

What is hilarious is that Saudi Arabia (and previously Qatar) picks the head of the Syrian National Coalition and Western media portrays the selection as "election". How is that election?  The executive committee of the SNC is also appointed by Qatar and Saudi regime.  Also, what you need to know about Mr. Bahrah is that 1) he worked for years in Saudi Arabia and is a loyal servant of the Saudi regime. 2) that he speaks English and use the appropriate words when ordered. 3) that he was a lackey of polygamous Jarba.  (This one is not polygamous which is a major shift in SNC policies).

FSA and SNC

FSA and SNC blame the Syrian regime for attacks on US embassies.