You know that this article is largely invented when you encounter such sentences: "“The Syrian Army is useless!” Suleimani told an Iraqi politician." And this on the first page. Based on the little that we know about him, this kind of talk is quite uncharacteristic of him. But when you read this sentence, you know that Filkins is talking to a Saudi or Hariri source reporting about Suleimani: "“Give me one brigade of the Basij, and I could conquer the whole country,” he said." But don't get me wrong. It is quite funny. And how would Filkins know this: "Suleimani called on Hassan Nasrallah"? Would it not be more plausible that Nasrallah acted on his own but with full consultation with Suleimani. The rank-and-file of Hizbullah have been calling for intervention all along, in fact. But wait, I take it back. Mr. Filkins has an inside source inside Hizbullah's command. His name is: "According to Will Fulton, an Iran expert at the American Enterprise Institute". OK, let us not mock him because at least he does have inside sources within the Iranian leadership. Meet his inside Iranian source: "“He has ties to every corner of the system,” Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad, told me." But enough kidding: Mr. Filkins does bring new information and insights about Suleimani. For example, did you know this about Suleimani before reading this valuable article? "Officials describe him as a believer in Islam." Really? So you are telling me that he is not--all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding--a believer in Buddhism? No way, man. Another revelation about him: "“I don’t think he’d listen to classical music,” the Middle Eastern official told me." But Mr. Filkins: can you ask your "Middle East [Israel or Saudi or Jordanian] official if he listens to rap or if he watches Dancing with the Stars? Thanks. But if you think that an expert at AEI is laughable, wait until this expert: "Suleimani gave few signs of greater ambition. According to Ali Alfoneh,
an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, he had only
a high-school education". And Filkins, who in this article is driven by his bevy of Israeli or pro-Israeli experts, is willing to contradict himself. Earlier, we read that he was a believer in Islam, but a few pages later you read: "Religion doesn’t drive him. Nationalism drives him, and the love of the fight.”" Which is which, Mr. Filkins? And then they tell you that New Yorker is famous for its editors and fact checkers (and I can attest that the fact checkers are not that good: I received calls from them over the years to check about Middle East facts, and many errors slip through). But wait: here is another reputable source on Suleimani for you: "According to the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom, fighters are recruited throughout the region". Those stories are so fictitious: a student in Middle East studies can find them laughable but not the writer evidently, look at this passage: "Jalal Talabani, handed a cell phone with a text message to General David
Petraeus, who had taken over the year before as the commander of
American forces. “Dear General Petraeus,” the text read, “you should
know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect
to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in
Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who’s going to replace
him is a Quds Force member.” After the five American soldiers were
killed in Karbala, Suleimani sent a message to the American Ambassador.
“I swear on the grave of Khomeini I haven’t authorized a bullet against
the U.S.,” Suleimani said. None of the Americans believed him." This sounds like Saeb Urayqat or Ahmad Chalabi and not Suleimani. And this guy is a flat-out lie: [Nasrallah]: "nd he has acknowledged the presence of Quds Force operatives in Lebanon". Nasrallah never ever said such a thing. This tells you how laughably uncredible this whole piece of...journalism is. And look at this one: this was claimed by Hariri tabloids: "One of them, Mustafa Badreddine—Imad Mughniyeh’s brother-in-law and a
longtime Hezbollah bomb maker—was spotted in Syria by the rebels, who
say that he is fighting for Assad." Spotted in Syria? And the rebels knows how Mustafa Badr-Ad-Din looks when the man has avoided being photographed? Spotted him? Wait. He must have been wearing a yellow cap that identified him by name and address, I bet. But this one sounds good (attributed to the same "Iraqi politician": "“Suleimani said: no Americans," Did he say no in English or Persian, by the way? And now on the methods of Suleimani (methods that the US strictly avoids in the Middle East region because it adheres to a sublime ethical order: "According to American and Iraqi former officials, Suleimani exerts
leverage over Iraqi politics by paying officials, by subsidizing
newspapers and television stations, and, when necessary, by
intimidation." And now look at the logic of this statement: "To save his Iranian empire in Syria and Lebanon, he has helped fuel a
Sunni-Shiite conflict that threatens to engulf the region for years to
come." The question is this: does this Sunni-Shi`ite conflict serves Iranian interests more or Saudi interests? I remember the time (very long time ago) when I thought that the New Yorker was a better sample of US journalism. That was a very long time ago, and I should add: I was more naive back then.