"Toby Matthiesen's new study of the Gulf counter-revolutions demonstrates how the Saudis, Bahrain and Kuwait have all combined repression and cash handouts with an almost instinctive sectarianism to keep demands for reform at bay.
The Saudis had long fretted about unrest in their predominantly Shia eastern province — the heartland of the kingdom's oil industry. But when republican dictators were being toppled in Tunis, Cairo and Tripoli and revolution was in the air just across the Gulf in Manama, anti-Shia feeling was ratcheted up with the mass arrests of local activists who were accused of being part of a "foreign conspiracy." It was supposedly led by Iran, but beyond shrill propaganda from Tehran and dark hints about "sleeper cells," there is no evidence of that.
Matthiesen, an Arabist who had worked for the highly-respected International Crisis Group, blurs the boundaries between journalism and academia with nuggets of vivid reportage and background knowledge that translates obscure historical legacies into comprehensible contemporary terms. (Anti-Shia prejudice is akin in some ways to hostility to Catholics in Protestant culture). And the Gulf monarchies, as he puts it, "think strategically in sectarian terms, and shape their foreign policies in those terms."
In the end however it is more about power than faith. Matthiesen observes that the official discourse surrounding the alleged meddling of (the Shia) Iranian state and the transnational (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood is actually very similar. And these allegations, he concludes, "are often about finding a scapegoat to deflect attention to an external enemy." Saudi policy towards Bashar al-Assad — still one of the more opaque aspects of the Syrian crisis — includes the encouragement of vicious anti-Alawi rhetoric from Gulf-based Sunni clerics. (Alawis are an offshoot of Shi'ism). In Kuwait, official prejudice is directed against the Brotherhood (as it is, in spades, in the UAE), as well as the tribes and the stateless Bidoon." (thanks Karim)
The Saudis had long fretted about unrest in their predominantly Shia eastern province — the heartland of the kingdom's oil industry. But when republican dictators were being toppled in Tunis, Cairo and Tripoli and revolution was in the air just across the Gulf in Manama, anti-Shia feeling was ratcheted up with the mass arrests of local activists who were accused of being part of a "foreign conspiracy." It was supposedly led by Iran, but beyond shrill propaganda from Tehran and dark hints about "sleeper cells," there is no evidence of that.
Matthiesen, an Arabist who had worked for the highly-respected International Crisis Group, blurs the boundaries between journalism and academia with nuggets of vivid reportage and background knowledge that translates obscure historical legacies into comprehensible contemporary terms. (Anti-Shia prejudice is akin in some ways to hostility to Catholics in Protestant culture). And the Gulf monarchies, as he puts it, "think strategically in sectarian terms, and shape their foreign policies in those terms."
In the end however it is more about power than faith. Matthiesen observes that the official discourse surrounding the alleged meddling of (the Shia) Iranian state and the transnational (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood is actually very similar. And these allegations, he concludes, "are often about finding a scapegoat to deflect attention to an external enemy." Saudi policy towards Bashar al-Assad — still one of the more opaque aspects of the Syrian crisis — includes the encouragement of vicious anti-Alawi rhetoric from Gulf-based Sunni clerics. (Alawis are an offshoot of Shi'ism). In Kuwait, official prejudice is directed against the Brotherhood (as it is, in spades, in the UAE), as well as the tribes and the stateless Bidoon." (thanks Karim)
