""Success"
in this strategy would be defined by the damage inflicted on Iran and its allies
-- and not by reducing the civilian body count, producing a more stable and
peaceful Syria, or marginalizing the more extreme jihadists. Ending the war
would not be a particular priority, unless it involved Assad's total military
defeat. The increased violence, refugee flows, and regionalization of conflict
would likely increase the pressure on neighboring states such as Turkey, Jordan,
Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq. It would also likely increase sectarianism, as
harping on Sunni-Shiite divisions is a key part of the Arab Gulf's political
effort to mobilize support for the Syrian opposition (and to intimidate local
Shiite populations, naturally). And the war zone would continue to be fertile
ground for al Qaeda's jihad, no matter how many arms were sent to its "moderate"
rivals in the opposition".