I have been troubled by the many misconceptions about `Alawites in Western and Arab media: they all assume, for example, that Hizbullah's alliance with the Asad regime is purely sectarian, thereby forgetting the old conflict (on many levels) between Shi`ites and `Alawites. And those ill-informed writers don't seem to explain the strong past alliance between Hamas and the same Syrian regime. So I have been discussing this with a brilliant colleague who is my unofficial academic adviser on Shi`ite religious and historical matters. So I asked him to elaborate on the differences between Shi`ite Twelvers and `Alawites. Unfortunately, he does not want to be quoted by name although he allows me to cite:
"There
is a long history to the Twelver-Alawite question. I will try to sum it up
without burdening you with theological minutia.
Within
the body of Imami Shiism there existed, from very early times, what we may now
term – though with obvious bias – ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ tendencies, mostly
centered on the view of the status of the Imams. The ‘moderate’ tendency managed
to gain the upper hand and eliminate certain groups of the extremist tendency
from the pale of Imami Shiism, thus defining ‘orthodoxy’ within Imami Shiism.
The eliminated groups, usually termed ‘ghulat’, are the intellectual ancestors
of the Alawites of greater Syria. We find categorical formulas denouncing them
as non-believers (kuffar) in the writings of the fathers of ‘orthodox’ Twelver
Shiism during its formative period in the 10-11th century (e.g.
Saduq, Mufid, Murtada and Tusi….).
Things
continued to be like this for a long time, especially as anti-Shii dynasties
came to power in greater Syria (Ayyubids, Mamluks and then Ottomans) whereas the
Shia of Mesopotamia and Persia fared better under their ruling dynasties
(Ilkhanids then Safavids). The rift between the two Shia groups grew wider with
time due to the lack of communication.
Towards
the end of the nineteenth century, there was a ‘rediscovery’ of these forgotten
Shia, i.e. the Alawites. Certain scholars in Najaf are responsible for that,
probably due to some Alawites appearing in the holy city as students, after a
long time of absence. From thereon, relations were revived, and correspondence
between ‘orthodox’ Twelver scholars and Alawite religious scholars commenced,
especially around the turn of the century (the main name from the Alawite side
is Sulayman al-Ahmad, father of the renowned poet Badawi al-Jabal). Things
developed further as the senior authorities in Najaf decided that they want to
invest more in trying to ‘correct’ the beliefs of these forgotten Shia; the most
important figure here is the Lebanese cleric Habib Aal-Ibrahim, whose progenyin
Lebanon now go by the surname al-Muhajir. Thus, a new era in the Alawite-Twelver
connection was inaugurated. After the Iranian revolution, and especially in the
last two decades, there has been an influx of Twelver clerics into the Alawite
community, spreading ‘orthodox’ Twelver teachings and practices.
From
the standpoint of ‘orthodox’ Twelvers, the Alawites are Twelver Shiites who were
led astray by the unfortunate circumstances of isolation and oppression for
prolonged times. In a way, they view them as people who need be restored to the
pale of true faith and delivered from ignorance. In this, ‘orthodox’ Twelver
Shiites are ignoring the fact that Alawites are the intellectual heirs of a
tradition within Shiism which is as old as the ‘orthodox’ tradition, it is
neither a novelty nor a result of ignorance and isolation.
Many
religiously educated Alawites protested this condescending attitude towards
them. But part of the problem, I believe, has to do with the ambiguity of the
Alawite representation of their creed. Probably due to oppression, a general
sense of severe caution overwhelms any conversation on the matter, in addition
to the unfortunate fact that many of the Alawites know not the basic points of
doctrine. So whatever the majority believes and does is always open to question
regarding its integrity as a reflection of what the Alawite creed
dictates.
On
the level of their status, this condescending attitude might have been a
blessing. It is what enabled a cleric like Musa al-Sadr to judge Alawites as
Muslims, on the grounds that the practices and beliefs of their masses – as far
as it may be from both Sunnism and ‘orthodox’ Shiism - are due to ignorance. In
that he relied on what their leading authorities asserted as their true beliefs.
It is a delicate balance: technically speaking, an ‘orthodox’ Twelver jurist has
to go by what the representatives of this sect tell him; if they renounce views
that are the most problematic, both doctrinally (the divinity of Ali) and
practically (the omission of ritual prayer and fasting), then the jurist must
abide by the verdict that they are Muslims, regardless of other relatively minor
objections. Having said all this, Musa al-Sadr must have been aware of the
situation, and must have exploited the technicality in order to achieve
political aims. If we go by the book, most ‘orthodox’ Twelver clerics would
still judge the Alawites, based on the beliefs and practices of their masses, as
non-believers (kuffar).
If we want to reconstruct the theological narrative of the
religious Alawites, it must be based on symmetrically biased terms. Instead of
‘extremist’ and ‘moderate’ Shiis, as used by ‘orthodox’ Twelvers, Alawites would
use terms such as ‘full-fledged’ and ‘short-comers’ in reference to themselves
and Twelvers, respectively.
This explains most of the story. Alawites, following their
intellectual ancestors, believe that the practices of ‘orthodox’ Twelvers are
too influenced by Sunni Islam; so much so that ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shīʿism has
lost the distinctive character of being a shia, namely the veneration of the
Imams. In underestimating the Imams’ status, ‘orthodox’ Twelvers have come short
of their real religious significance. Equally condescending terms are used on
the Alawite side to denote Twelvers and their ilk, such as the ‘poor’ the ‘weak’
believers. Twelvers, for Alawites, are definitely much more accepted than
Sunnis, but their creed suffers serious deviations that need be fixed. Alawites
and Twelvers are both far from fully accepting each other.
Whether Alawites consider themselves Muslims is a thornier
question. As a matter of principle, I believe no one should be denied a
religious label s/he is adopting, regardless of the person’s divergence from
that label’s mainstream dictates. To address the particular case of Alawites,
they do consider themselves Muslims. However, they are more keen on distancing
themselves from Sunni beliefs than on asserting their Muslim identity, which
leaves the impression that they repudiate Islam itself. Any assertion of theirs
that seems otherwise is in fact saying that they are not Muslims if by Muslims
one means Sunni Islam. Alawites, therefore, believe themselves to be the true
Muslims. In this they are unlike, for example, Bahai’s who consider Islam to
have become obsolete following the new call of Bahaullah and the advent of new
age and religion."
