Interview with Aron Lund on Syrian conflict: Part II

My second part of my interview with Swedish journalist, Aron Lund, who I regard as the most knowledgeable observer of the Syrian opposition.  (By the way, notice that Lund is rarely cited in the press while the Zionist hoodlums of WINEP who can't tell the difference between batata and baraziq are always cited):

"1) How do you keep up with developments in Syria? I recall you don’t know Arabic, so how do you compensate?

Well, I do know a bit of Arabic, I studied it for several years, but I'm not nearly good enough to brag about it. I keep up as best I can by reading the news and various Syria analysts, trying to pick sources from all sides, following rebel group statements and videos, and I also interview people regularly. My original interest was in the history of the dissident movement, so I've been interviewing people in the opposition since about 2006, and did a lot of background reading and research. That still helps, despite the changes that occurred from 2011 onwards. Anyway, I definitely don't pretend to have the full picture, I'm just giving my two cents as an outsider. If anyone finds it useful, great.

2) If the regime falls, what scenario is more likely to follow?

Depends on how it falls, when it falls. I’ve long thought people need to stop talking in terms of a "fall" of the regime, as a time-specific event.

It could happen just like that (a coup, a collapse, an invasion, a sudden breakthrough in negotiations, etc), but judging from the past two years, it seems more likely that the regime will just keep contracting, without laying down arms. At some point of course, the parameters of the conflict will shift. How? In retrospect, I'm sure it will all seem obvious, but for now it's all a haze.

I also think people are underestimating the extent to which this regime has been gutted since 2011. Bashar is already a lame duck dictator. He’s still in formally in office, but it’s manifestly clear that he cannot control the whole country, and he is not likely to ever do so again.

Even if he clings to office and fakes another presidential election win in 2014 (make your bets now: more or less than 97 percent of the vote?), the international community and the media will at some point have to stop describing him as the president. Take away Aleppo or Damascus or both from the regime, and from then on he’s just going to be seen as Syria’s ex-president, or its best-armed warlord, no matter what his supporters say. In a civil war, legitimacy is all in the eye of the beholder. Saddam Hussein claimed to be the real president of Iraq right up until December 30, 2006, and hundreds of thousands of people – if not millions – claimed to believe him.

3) So in the first part of the interview, were you denying that there were armed groups operating in Syria before the summer of 2011? So the later active Jihadis were simply dormant or were simply demonstrating peacefully?

No, not denying it happened, just saying that at that time organized armed action was totally marginal to the larger revolutionary movement, and did not have popular support within the opposition. The government also systematically tried to blow it out of proportion in its propaganda. Disorganized community violence was probably somewhat more widespread, e.g. in conservative tribal regions where people hit back at the gov and its supporters after relatives were killed. But violence was still not the main thrust of the uprising, then.

4) Why is the regime still standing in your opinion?

It still has guns and resources, significant popular support in many of the areas that it still controls (not elsewhere), and the capacity to intimidate those who doubt it or oppose it. The key to its survival has been the survival of Bashar el-Assad himself and the lack of inner-core defections and splits (as far as we know). This is related to its structure: the security networks underpinning everything, Alawite and minority community support, clan networks, family connections, and so on. Also, there's the obvious fact that the government started out with a vastly larger arsenal, and had things like an air force – this has slowed the rebel advances enormously. But all these advantages are beginning to wear down, and the regime is slowly losing hold of more and more areas now. The tide is against it.

The only exception to this rule is that the opposition is now also quite rapidly losing popularity and legitimacy in Syria and abroad, while the government seems to have hit bottom both internally and internationally a long time ago. For Bashar, that’s a net gain, but not one which is likely to save him.

I'd be a little surprised if this regime is still in recognizable shape a year from now, but I would also be surprised if it or its successor groups were not still fighting in some areas of the country. On the other hand, it would be stupid to rule anything out. For all I know, Bashar could still be fighting and claiming to be the president of Syria ten years from now, even if he's holed up in a bunker in Damascus or Qardaha. And a negotiated comeback isn't technically impossible, just wildly implausible.

5) In the new Syria, do you think that the Syrian National Council and the Syrian National Coalition will prove to be as irrelevant as the Iraqi National Congress proved to be in Iraq?

First of all, both the SNC and the NC are much more broadly based than the INC was before the Iraq war. That said, they're extremely weak on the inside, and it depends on the outcome of the armed conflict. If there's more significant foreign intervention (direct or indirect) in their favor, or if there's a negotiated solution, these groups (or factions of them) could become relevant. Otherwise they're likely to fade away and disintegrate, or be forced to settle for a minor part.

Right now, I think all eyes should be on the armed opposition and the regime, since they are the actual players on the ground. But things can change very rapidly. Say Aleppo falls or flips: if someone manages to establish a semi-functioning Benghazi-style government there with foreign funding, he could quickly turn into a major player. But who would that be? Someone parachuted in from the NC, someone put forth by local Islamists, some defecting general? I don't know.

6) Are you denying that Western governments prefer a protracted civil war in Syria, just as they had enjoyed the long Iraqi-Iranian war in the 1980s?

Correct, I don't think they do, and they definitely didn't at the start of the uprising. As far as I can tell, most Western governments view a protracted civil war as among the worst-case scenarios imaginable. Not out of the kindness of their hearts perhaps, but because of the destabilizing effect, refugee flow, upsurge in jihadi extremism, etc. Assad wasn't so bad for the West. He was a nuisance, but ultimately a guy they could deal with.

On your Iraq-Iran comparison – well, if the demolition of Syria were helping the USA beat the Soviet Union, it might be another story, but the Cold War ended in 1989.

The more immediate problem is that while many governments, Western and others, seem to realize the risks and more or less support the idea of negotiations, they also won’t budge from their core interests. They are either unwilling or unable to compromise on related regional issues in a way that could help craft a compromise. That prevents a broad coalition from forming. Unless you get the USA, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, Qatar, Turkey, etc on board, I think a negotiated solution in Syria is hard to envisage. Any one of the core players could use their clients to try to torpedo an agreement backed by the others. All seem to prioritize weakening their enemies’ hold over Syria, over saving Syrian lives.

7) Did I detect in your previous answers a belittling of the roles of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria?

I don't know, did you?

I think they're playing a hugely important role, as main financial sponsors of the opposition.

8) If Basshar dies tomorrow, and the regime falls (assuming such an easy process), who will rule Syria the next day, week, or year?

No one will rule Syria from that point on, but someone will rule what’s left of the regime. Next day and the week after: brother Maher or some other thug from the inner circle, perhaps behind a nicer-looking front figure. A year from then, not a clue. Bashar’s death could easily lead to the disintegration of the regime. It’s very poorly institutionalized, and there’s no overestimating his symbolic value for the system."