"o why and how did this happen in Raqqa? Put simply, it’s because the
regime had diluted its forces here, deploying them to other parts of the
country, and because the forces aligned against Assad were mainly
Islamists, largely outside the broad umbrella of the more secular,
loosely organized, and in some cases poorly disciplined Free Syrian Army
(FSA).
The offensive was spearheaded by Jabhat al-Nusra (which the U.S considers a terrorist group with ties to al-Qaeda), the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham brigade and Jabhat al-Wahda al-Tahrir al-Islamiya (a grouping of some two dozen battalions)–all non-FSA groups who prefer the term Mujahedin (holy warriors) to revolutionaries, the label many FSA use to describe themselves.
A special unit of Ahrar al-Sham called Liwa Omana al Raqqa (or the Brigade of Security for Raqqa) was tasked with securing government installations after they fell, protecting public and private property and maintaining services to the city. The unit was specifically formed with this aim, according to its commander, Abu Tayf, a history graduate who used to work in real estate. “We had sleeper cells inside the city for a long time. When we entered the city, they rose and implemented the plan,” he says. “The project was devised a long time ago.”
There are also spray-painted messages around the city warning against theft. “A thief’s hand will be cut. Signed Jabhat al-Nusra” is plastered in many places, including outside the Real Estate Bank, which like the other banks in the city, is guarded by Nusra.
Several commanders of various Islamist units said they prevented some FSA units from entering the city, either during or after the battle, because they feared they might be more interested in looting than fighting. In at least one instance, an FSA unit was turned away by force, after an exchange of gunfire. “We did not forbid the free army, we forbade people who we suspected wanted to cause trouble in the city,” says Dr. Samer, “emir” of Jabhat al-Wahda al-Tahrir al-Islamiya who formerly went by the nom de guerre Abu Hakam. “I’m talking about certain individuals or battalions, but we don’t forbid people from Jihad.”
The offensive was spearheaded by Jabhat al-Nusra (which the U.S considers a terrorist group with ties to al-Qaeda), the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham brigade and Jabhat al-Wahda al-Tahrir al-Islamiya (a grouping of some two dozen battalions)–all non-FSA groups who prefer the term Mujahedin (holy warriors) to revolutionaries, the label many FSA use to describe themselves.
A special unit of Ahrar al-Sham called Liwa Omana al Raqqa (or the Brigade of Security for Raqqa) was tasked with securing government installations after they fell, protecting public and private property and maintaining services to the city. The unit was specifically formed with this aim, according to its commander, Abu Tayf, a history graduate who used to work in real estate. “We had sleeper cells inside the city for a long time. When we entered the city, they rose and implemented the plan,” he says. “The project was devised a long time ago.”
There are also spray-painted messages around the city warning against theft. “A thief’s hand will be cut. Signed Jabhat al-Nusra” is plastered in many places, including outside the Real Estate Bank, which like the other banks in the city, is guarded by Nusra.
Several commanders of various Islamist units said they prevented some FSA units from entering the city, either during or after the battle, because they feared they might be more interested in looting than fighting. In at least one instance, an FSA unit was turned away by force, after an exchange of gunfire. “We did not forbid the free army, we forbade people who we suspected wanted to cause trouble in the city,” says Dr. Samer, “emir” of Jabhat al-Wahda al-Tahrir al-Islamiya who formerly went by the nom de guerre Abu Hakam. “I’m talking about certain individuals or battalions, but we don’t forbid people from Jihad.”
