A deviation of a revolution that never was a revolution

"Where does the armed opposition, or what is called the Free Army or several other names, derive its popular legitimacy when it carries out sectarian assassinations, torture, humiliation, and executions against its prisoners from amongst the [regime's] security services and army? This was precisely what we described as brutality when it was committed by the criminal regime. Where does it derive its popular legitimacy when it speaks of a war between Sunnis and Shi'is, or Alawis, as is wished for by those that call themselves the Friends of Syria or the friends of the regime? What distinguishes the discourse of the opposition from the discourse of the regime when one of them speaks of Sunnis, Shi'is, and Alawis, while the other speaks of Salafis, Islamists, and terrorists? Both discourses operate beneath the national level, which gathers and views all as equal with respect to human rights. Both discourses indirectly call for a long-term Iraq-like divisive civil war. How can the people consider the armed opposition to be the military arm of the revolution, for which one of its principles were "one, one, one … the Syrian people are one," and that offered the lives of its sons for the sake of building a civilian state, not a religious emirate or a Muslim Brotherhood state? If we take into consideration the external role of exporting a militant religious or Salafist discourse—that is a stranger to the moderate religious discourse of Syrian society—to the ranks of combat battalions, then this only increases the deviation of the revolution from its national level. In this view, the enemy is no longer the sectarian authoritarian Syrian regime, but rather the Alawis, the Shi'is, or other categories of people."