"The situation is far more complex than during the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya.
In contrast to their ousted leaders, it does appear that the Assad regime still enjoys the support of significant sectors of the country's patchwork society, increasingly polarised as the crisis deepens. By and large, his own Alawite minority apparently continues to stand with him, some no doubt fearful of the consequences of change. The same seems generally to be true of other minorities, especially the Christians, with more questionable allegiance from the Kurds and Druze. Secular-minded and business circles within the middle classes of the majority Sunni community, especially in the two biggest cities, have also shown little enthusiasm for the revolt, which some fear might bring Islamists to the fore, especially now that armed action is increasingly in the picture. The regime has also apparently been able to continue using the army and security forces in a repressive role without them going to pieces. There have been individual or group defections on the ground, but not by whole units. What nobody knows - probably not even the regime itself - is how long it can go on using forces in which the rank and file are necessarily largely Sunni, to quell a largely Sunni-based revolt." (thanks Ben)
In contrast to their ousted leaders, it does appear that the Assad regime still enjoys the support of significant sectors of the country's patchwork society, increasingly polarised as the crisis deepens. By and large, his own Alawite minority apparently continues to stand with him, some no doubt fearful of the consequences of change. The same seems generally to be true of other minorities, especially the Christians, with more questionable allegiance from the Kurds and Druze. Secular-minded and business circles within the middle classes of the majority Sunni community, especially in the two biggest cities, have also shown little enthusiasm for the revolt, which some fear might bring Islamists to the fore, especially now that armed action is increasingly in the picture. The regime has also apparently been able to continue using the army and security forces in a repressive role without them going to pieces. There have been individual or group defections on the ground, but not by whole units. What nobody knows - probably not even the regime itself - is how long it can go on using forces in which the rank and file are necessarily largely Sunni, to quell a largely Sunni-based revolt." (thanks Ben)
