the US and democracy promotion in Tunisia

"In reality, a clear gulf exists between US and EU material commitments to their respective democracy promotion policies in Tunisia. In monetary terms, region-wide funding for MEPI’s political pillar for 2006 was $43 million (MEPI 2007a). Yet this money however was divided between all participating states on a project-by-project basis. In contrast, for the 2005–2006 period, the EU contributed E30 million to governance-related projects in Tunisia alone (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2005). Finding data on Tunisia-specific MEPI political pillar projects is difficult, largely because few such projects exist, and the majority of MEPI projects in Tunisia at the time of writing were limited to the economic, education and women’s pillars of the initiative (MEPI 2007c). BMENA meanwhile is yet to deliver anything specific to Tunisia. In actual fact, the only current MEPI-funded political pillar programmes in Tunisia are an AMIDEAST programme to train journalists to write in English; a ‘round table with a twist’ con-sultation programme with civil society, government and media representatives; and the Arab Institute for Business Leaders, aiming to promote better governance and business practices in the region. Not only are these initiatives very limited in the context of a wider democratisation process but Tunisia has far fewer MEPI political pillar initiatives than any of the neighbouring states. Furthermore, USAID, the main democracy-promoting organ of the US government, is not present in Tunisia at all. Indeed, the US appears to have adopted a ‘little and rarely’ approach vis-a`-vis democracy promotion in Tunisian. Its position is reflected in the words of US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch who, as part of a speech to Tunisian journalists on 15 March 2006, claimed that ‘every country undertakes . . . reforms at its own pace and in its own context’ (Embassy of the United States Tunis 2006). Thus, in the case of the US at
least, actual material commitments to support the democratisation process suggests a commit-ment to only very slow and gradual reform."  From Powel, Brieg Tomos(2009) 'The stability syndrome: US and EU democracy promotion in Tunisia', The Journal of North African Studies, 14: 1, 57 — 73. (thanks Eric)