Comrade Khaled responds to Comrade Kamal, yet again:
"I do not know the identity of the person you referred to him as Comrade Kamal, and preferred to refer to him as such to afford him the respect that he seemed to deserve in your blog. Nor do I am happy with the title Mister and never ever used even my academic titles to establish credibility. Mister is fine!
"I do not know the identity of the person you referred to him as Comrade Kamal, and preferred to refer to him as such to afford him the respect that he seemed to deserve in your blog. Nor do I am happy with the title Mister and never ever used even my academic titles to establish credibility. Mister is fine!
I did not know he is from Hama. I did not presume he is from Hama or has any connection with that Syrian city. My statement was very clear: “I certainly appreciate and do not wish to disturb the sensitivities, particularly the attachment of some in Hama…”
I quote from Miles Copeland’s book, which is heavily annotated by my father, adding and correcting some references. The statement is made on page 45 in the 1969 edition. Neither did I assume its total, nor was it disputed by my father’s notes. Incidentally, my father arranged to declare Miles Copeland Personna non Grata and he was thrown out of Syria for being an American spy when he was chief of the Deuxième Bureau, immediately before Al-Za’eem’s coup. The fact that Shishakli had interviews with him is probably telling!
I submit, further, that my father notes may not be adequate, partial and not necessarily impartial. He was arrested by every single dictator who knocked on the gates of the Syrian Army Commandary. He may well be mistaken being so close to events, and my recollections may be inaccurate as a child of 9-years old, too. I was not writing a definitive, but a sketch of the events that preceded the deposition of Shishakli. In this vein, I did express my appreciation for the comments and considered the contributions of Comrade Kamal very useful.
Al-Za’eem’s summary execution after a mock trial – which no one knows if it ever took place - was in itself a suspicious act. While Shishakli did not lead the coup against him, he certainly was an important partner of Hinnawi, and assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army once Hinnawi assumed the Presidency. This does suggest to me that the Miles Copeland story is not far fetched, and the location of the grave of Al-Za’eem in the French Cemetery – so odd and so strange, and no doubt did not please the French – verifies somewhat Copland’s story.
As far as I could remember, the tank that went out of control was deployed against demonstrators. If not, then not. The fact of the matter is that the removal of Shishakli released the anger of the people of Syria and led to the tsunami of democracy. Progressives: a section of the Nationalists (الكتلة الوطنية), a section of the popularists (حزب الشعب), the Ba’thists and Communists. That period, 1955-1958 was unequalled in the number of victories the Syrians scored against the US – never mind Britain and France who were licking their 1956 Suez wounds!
To that end, I left open the question whether the popular revolt against Shishakli was the motive for the Army’s revolt or not, by insisting to give the Tunisian the ‘Cup’ amongst other observations I made severally on the matter.
To presume that Shishakli had good relations with France and cool relations with Britain does not tally with historical progression. Shishakli came to prevent unity with Iraq. This was an important US objective. He had an earlier history that is not unpatriotic, as I made probably repeatedly in my first reply. He certainly distanced himself from France, the well-established power according to several sources behind Al-Za’eem. But he did approach Britain who did supply him with a modicum of armament, including the Meteor fighters.
On that score, I did not propose that the Meteor fighters were French. I do state “Shishakli's relations with Britain soured over the disinclination of Britain to provide arms. While he ruled behind President (General) Fawzi Selo, whom he pushed up, Britain total delivery of arms were 4 (four) Meteor fighters.” Anyway, it is a mistake I cannot make, having spent my graduate years in Fluid Mechanics and Aeronautics… in England!
Shishakli’s assassination of Col Nasser, the commander of the Syrian Air Force, cannot be excused on the grounds of being pro-Unity with Iraq. References suggest that he was a contender of Shishakli and his murder was probably the first act that separated Shishakli from the group of officers who were happy to see the end of Al-Za’eem regime. As it is presented in the comment on my reply, it is still a murder of a political opponent who represented a main trend in Syria facing Israel. The Kingdom of Egypt was not a choice for a poor country exposed to the gangsters down south, hence a certain degree of legitimacy –with obvious short-sightedness – drove many Syrians in that direction. Note that no Syrian favored unity with Jordan, for example.
That the same officers who clustered around Shishakli formed later the Army’s ‘national front’ is a reflection on the nature of their support when he staged his coup. All the named officers became later important functionaries in the United Arab Republic and remained so until the mess that the Egyptian leadership made in Syria became unbearable and some were either removed or resigned. They, however, helped reinforce, while Vice Presidents and ministers a solid anti-imperialist orientation for Syria, traces of which we see in Syrian foreign policy to this day. This may not even agree with the views of Salah El-Bizri or even in a few statements made by ‘Afeef El-Bizri – the former was a visitor of the Mezza prison twice on orders by Nasser, and the latter spent three years hiding in Jabal Al-Akrad in Damascus, and as a refugee in Moscow and Prague! Still, it is a fact – and one that should make one proud of.
The references to Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash, the Commander of the Syrian Revolution (against the French), disturbs me. Many Syrian patriots went off to Jordan then Lebanon as political refugees. Where else could they escape the murderous thugs Shishakli, and what did they represent? Did that reflect on the struggle of the Atrash clan for independence from the French, and their insistence to unite the Jabal with Syria? Their desire to establish an autonomous region is a subject of another investigation, particularly regarding what surrounded it. What role did Israel play, through probably the Druzes in Israel? What role did the post-independence Syrian Governments (including that of Shukri Al-Kawatly) play in discrimination against this minority? Unless one grapples with the problems of the minorities in our midst, one is playing the ostrich game while the US and Israel provides an alternative… South Sudan, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria’s Kurds, Turkey’s Kurds, the Maronites, the Armenians, the Assyrians, the Chaldaneans, etc. etc. and dare I say, the Shiites and the Alwaites?
It is difficult to be objective if one lived those heady days and their disappointments. However, countervailing such disappointments are signal victories and important achievements to be recognized. The demise of Husni Al-Za’eem can be considered, in the light of subsequent events, the end of French new-colonialist ambitions towards Syria (I wish the same happened in the Lebanon). The Shishakli regime ended the British ones, to be finally broken by the 1958 Revolution in Iraq. The US attempts to inherit Syria was successfully prevented by the very same officers and politicians who are accused in the comment on my reply of being aids to Shishakli. The entire movement of history is viewed in a static, idealist manner devoid of its feverish dynamics and interactions, not to say dialectics.
I am aware that residues of the past, due to social, political and other affiliations, and sometimes in large doses, linger on particularly in closed environments. They, unfortunately, provide a framework for historical assessments, which are probably natural, but can be most misleading – particularly to the young and earnest new generation of peoples in the Middle East. One’s duty is to provide the details in the context of the historical transformation and the overarching tasks of the national liberation struggle, which is what we all are waging, although sometimes we choose to refuse to acknowledge.
In passing, it is the unfinished tasks of the national liberation struggle of the Arab and other peoples in the region, that nationalism lives, and Arab Nationalism would remain as a central ideology from the Iranian border to the Atlantic Ocean.
Again, I thank the commentator and yourself for an opportunity to consider these issues and assure him that some of his points are well taken."
