"The Official Surrender: Camp David and its Aftermath
It’s the 30th anniversary of Camp David: We count the hours, the seconds and the deep anger that lead up to this memory. It thus comes to pass in the Arab political life without any hoopla or without even someone who notices or who is unnerved by it. Israel and its allies want the Arabs to commemorate the anniversary with feasts and jubilation, while praising Sadat in popular Arab memory.
The regime in Egypt deals with the anniversary of the signing of the Camp David treaty with a lot of embarrassment: it only mentions in the minimum required manner, and merely as a repayment of dues to America & Israel. Still, it sent an ambassador to celebrate in Israel and to denounce Iran from there. Why should Hosni Mubarak be ashamed of anything? The mummified president is determined now to be in the complete service of Israeli interests for the sake of getting the approval of the American congress of Jamal Mubarak’s succession. All the leaders’ kin are whiz kids without any exception. The commentators in the newspapers owned by the house of Saud are reprimanding the Arab public opinion for not falling in love with Anwar Sadat, and for not seeing in the Camp David accord what elevates Arabs.
Hazim Saghiya (who stopped all of a sudden his criticism of the Syrian regime after previously having been doing so on a weekly basis, but beware of thinking that this has anything to do with the reconciliation between the Saud and the Assad families, because the media of the house of Saud princes is definitely a free media) said that Anwar Sadat alone knew how to get out of the mud. The mud here means the resistance against Israel’s occupation and the rejection of American interference and plans. Your friend Saghiya said that Sadat’s recipe is the remedy to prevent divisions and to build societies and states. Did he mean that Sadat’s sectarian incitement against Copts and the provocation of sectarian tensions were for the sake of building society? Did his encouragement of extremist fundamentalism in order for him to use it against Nasserism and the left, was to build the state? Were his orders to imprison basically everyone for the sake of justice, and nothing else? Or could it be perhaps that in the same spirit as the consideration that Saudi King’s invitation of Shemon Peres to an intimate dinner in New York “was the greatest initiative in human history?” The media owned by the House of Saud wants us to acknowledge Sadat’s wisdom, the same wisdom that has been a facilitator of all the subsequent wars and invasions by the state of Israel against Arab countries and populations since Camp David and to this very day; Israel bombed (or invaded) since Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan and even Tunisia. Yes let us indeed give the man the credit he deserves: Why should we not write on his tombstone the names of all Arab victims of Israel’s direct aggression since 1977?
Who does not among us, us being those who were contemporary of the era of doom & gloom, remember it with all its details? Who among us was not frozen in front of the television set to make doubly sure that this horrible travesty is actually happening? Who among us did not wish (and some in Fatah actually expected) that the doors of Sadat’s plane will burst open with the Egyptian special forces rushing out and killing the leadership of the usurping entity? But the airplane’s hatch was opened only for Anwar Sadat to disembark – the man who turned out to be the ultimate helping hand to Zionism is all of its history – greeting the enemy with humiliation. The entity’s leaders were lined up to welcome their dear guest. The same faces that we remember from the 60s political cartoons of leaders who, including Golda Meyer, and who humiliated us in the 1967 war, were all there to greet Sadat and welcome him.
Many books and theses were put forward about Camp David, especially in America. We know today the following: The American team during the tough negotiations was even firmer on behalf of Egypt that was the ruler of Egypt himself. Even his advisors were suspicious that he came under some kind of a fugue state. Oussama Al-Baz judged early on that “the chief has gone bonnkers”. But the conspiracy was engendered in the 1973 war itself. They sold to us a fake victory in preparation for a boisterous Egyptian surrender. It was a war to start other wars [by Israel] that followed, not for the sake of peace. The Arab narrations of the “idea” of initiative is a lie or mostly inaccurate at best. They tell us of negotiations that took place in Morocco and the spiritual contrivances of Hassan Al-Tuhami (the quack) or of a role played by the tyrannical Ceauşescu, who was a friend America and Sadat alone and since Sadat was a friend of Israel. But Jimmy Carter revealed the truth only a couple of weeks ago: the plan, its execution and its supervision was purely American from start to end. Sadat was trying to please the Americans since the start of his presidency, and they only saw in him a clown as Zbigniew Brzezinski admits in his memoirs. But clowning does not apparently contradict with absolute allegiance and surrender. He sent many notable messages in this context: A rowdy expelling of Soviet advisors. But that wasn’t nearly enough for the Americans. What’s required is much, much more. He repeated time and again his threats of decisive military action, but the American administration ignored the clown. In the Arab world, the people was still in comatose brought by their disbelieve that the man who defined modern Arab politics had passed away. Sadat did not provoke Nasserists in the beginning. He is a good actor, same as his cleric Al-Sha’rawi: Sadat faints at the funeral, at the 40 day memoery and outbids Abdul-Nasser’s followers in showing loyalty. But he started skillfully and intelligently (helped my Mohammad Hasanein Haykal in this) eliminating the powerful team that once surrounded Abdul-Nasser. Sadat was proficient in coining slogans and terms. He called them “the pillars of power” and made their danger look more dangerous than Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and other Arab lands. He foiled coups, conspiracies and schemes one after another, like he used to tell us. Then came the 1973 war. The 1973 was without a doubt the most damaging war in the historic and strategic struggle with Israel. The defeat in 1967 was obvious and clear to everyone and no one could cover it up, even with the scam of calling it “Al-Naksa” (The setback) as if the 1956 war was not also a setback especially when the Field-Marshal had guaranteed victory swearing on his own “neck”. But at least, the 1967 war motivated people and unleashed the Fidaeyeen (self-sacrificing warriors) - guerrilla movements – in the entire Arab world. At last, the Arab public opinion had now become certain that Arab regimes, whether Nasserist or Baathist, and not to mention pro-colonial regimes in the Gulf and in Jordan and other countries, are unreliable and incapable as well as not ready to fight a liberation war against Israel. It became clear that the Arab regimes did not well prepare for the liberation of Palestine despite the promises given and the glossy slogans raised. As for the 1973 war, it was the war that was planned for it to be that last of Arab-Israeli wars at least by Arab regimes. A lot has been said about the Egyptian trick and Sadat’s lies in the war. This is true, but the Syrian regime’s underperformance was not less catastrophic. Both regimes did not really intend to liberate occupied Arab lands. Zionist propaganda met the propaganda of Arab regimes in making fun of the Arab soldier’s competence and combat skills. Ken Pollack however, dismissed this in his book about the history of Arab warfare. The voluminous book makes very important conclusions, noting that it has yet to be translated to Arabic. Pollack expressed a different opinion from the common opinion about the Arab combatant’s stupidity and incompetence. He studied all Arab battles against Israel and against America (in what relates to the Iraqi army in 1991) and found that the opinion paradigm present in both Arab & Western circles about the performance of the Arab soldier was completely wrong and that the fighter is effective when given the chance, Pollack attributed any incompetence shown to the tactical factor. The elements of initiative and leadership are a given in American & Israeli armed forces, however, Arab armies were trained especially in the 60s and beyond, on not taking any initiatives or decisions until orders are received from the central command in the capital, and signed by the leader (or his son in law.) This element has dominated the tactics of the Palestinian revolution forms in Lebanon until 1982. Yasser Arafat who was very much in love with giving orders no matter how small – or specially if they’re small – used to insist on signing all memoranda even when it came to providing stationary for the storm forces in South Lebanon. Such an insistence on handing out orders and preventing leaders on the battle field or in farther regions from taking the initiative comes from a authoritarian mentality. How can the central Arab command consider the opinions of soldiers and officers posted on the border when they are in effect afraid of starting an unwanted war with the enemy (we still haven’t forgotten the Ba’ath regime in Syria’s slogan that insists on choosing the right time and place of battle, but the slogan has been replaced in the most recent summit in Damascus with the slogan of “waiting” for the occupied land to return, maybe on a train car it seems). These Arab armies were formed not to liberate Palestine or the other occupied Arab lands, but to preserve and protect regimes and defend the capital against power greedy conspirators. The elite units in Arab armies were and still are positioned not on the border with Israel but in the capital to defend the one and only leader and his gracious wife and his prodigal son even if the latter were an infant. As for the units posted on the border, that was assigned to the weakest and least equipped battalions. The Syrian or Iraqi leadership for example, was more motivated against the rival wings in the Ba’ath party than they were against the Israeli enemy. The book by Michael Oren about 1967 speaks of an enormous and swift Syrian advancement on the Golan front in the beginning of the battle to the extent that Israel forces were about to withdraw, but a mysterious order was given to the Syrian army to withdraw and for still unknown reasons. As for Egyptian forces that were worn-out by the war in Yemen where western colonialism threw everything they had in the Egyptian army’s face, they were under the command of the King of Hashish (Abdul-Hakim ‘Amer). Only if the court of Al-Muhdawi or a similar court had sentenced the man…but the problem was not only that and is rather a structural problem not exclusive to the personality of the Field-Marshal no matter how sketchy and suitable he was, suitable for the enemy that is.
Camp David was the culmination of an American-Israel airtight plot that started when the nature of Sadat’s leadership became known, the former Nazi. The plan was simple: Isolating Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict will lower the possibility of the front inflaming again and will give Israel a bigger space to maneuver, especially when the Hashemite rule was allegiant to Zionism since its inception and became even more obedient to Zionism following the Amman massacres, when Israel interfered along with America to rescue the servant of colonialism. The plan was simple: Isolating Egypt will lead to thwart any future total Arab war against the usurping entity. The plan succeeded but the schemers did not account for what the Palestinian resistance wanted to do ever since the 60s: depending on popular resistances to wage war against Israel without the interference of Arab armies, however, Yasser Arafat missed this opportunity, and used resistance to improve his position in diplomatic negotiations. The result was that he failed in both resistance and diplomacy as once said in a comment by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
We know a lot about the secrets of the Camp David era today. We know that all Arab regimes were lying and pretending and claiming when it came to their resistance and struggling. King Hussein – that man who became addicted in his loyalty to America and the interests of Israel – did not severe his ties with Sadat, King Fahd encouraged him in secret, which was reflected by the Hawadith magazine the mouthpiece of King Fahd since Nasser died. The regime of Saddam Hussein assigned Nizar Hamdoun the mission of official sucking up to Zionism in Washington. Arab regimes stopped denouncing Anwar Sadat and Camp David (including the PLO and the “defiance” regimes which are still awaiting to designate the right time and place for the battle and now for the peace treaty with Israel). But the regimes of Arab surrender suffer from a chronic crisis: Their policies are based on the (non) logic of yielding to American and Israel terms, while the Arab public opinion whether Islamist, Nationalist or even Leftist is staunchly opposed to any normalization or peace treaty with Israel. The NOs of Khartoum, which were not chosen by the official Arab regime in ‘67, but were rather imposed on it by the Arab public opinion that refused to turn the appalling defeat into an opportunity of surrender. This dilemma still irks the liberal Arab elite allied with the oppressors of the house of Saud: This explains the deep contempt shown by the preachers of Wahhabi enlightenment of the public because they do not share the same opinion about surrender with the “moderate” regimes.
Arab regimes used to threaten war: now the Saudi king threatens to stop begging Israel for full normalization. The regime’s options are tough since they are in a hurry to get rid of the Palestinian cause, taking advantage of the death of Arafat and his replacement by an American-Israeli agent in the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority (and the mandate of which is now expired). But these regimes did not succeed in this same as Bush – whose doctrine produced massive but expensive public relations campaigns aimed at the Arab and Islamic world – and failed in subduing their people and in convincing the Arab public opinion of the truthfulness of Ali Salem and Mithal Al-Alousi’s ideas in normalization with Israel. In addition, the Saudi media and its branching outlets are embarrassed because they can’t go too far in crying over Anwar Sadat. This is because they officially stood against him and denounced him in their media at the time of Camp David, while King Fahd was encouraging Jimmy Carter in growing forward with his sponsorship of the surrender-treaty with Israel.
The danger of Camp David does not only lie in the treaty, but also in the methodology and policy in dealing with peace that Sadat summarized with his famous statement about the necessity of handing all the negotiation cards to America. Such a pattern of policy or wishful thinking has elevated the American hyper power even during the cold war. Anwar Sadat and the Saudi regime have accepted the unipolarity of American power even before the demise of the communist empire. This means that Arab countries deliberately helped in exiling the soviet option as a negotiation card that can be used in their international negotiations prior to the end of the cold war. This is despite the fact that the Soviet position never changed from recognizing Israel within the 1967 border lines. Moreover, the Camp David accord, and before it the Sadat initiative (which was supported in Lebanon by Saeb Salam, Salim Al-Lawzi and lest we forget Israel’s allies in Lebanon such as Georges ‘Idwan, Solange Gemayel (Ariel Sharon’s cook during his visits to Lebanon) and Samir Geagea and the Antoine Lahd gang) gave the PLO the grounds that Arafat was waiting for to give away the rights of the Palestinian people, and to give up armed struggle as a gift in return for an imaginary authority in some of the lands of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Nevertheless, the Camp David plot spread on the official level, and widened the gap between the latter and the popular level. But there are many things that do not help the popular level when it comes to having influence and exertine pressure. The Arab regimes have been capable since the early 70s of thwarting the effectiveness or even the capability of coups which constituted – even when they failed – a pressure card on the comportment of Arab regimes, especially with what pertains to the Palestinian cause.
The Arab public opinion has thus lost its ability to influence whether by threatening or by instilling the fear of sudden coup d’états which worried the rulers but became now past stories except in Mauritania. The latter is the perfect example, because it is today more democratical than all of the Arab regimes. The public opinion there managed to foil the American-Israeli plot to impose normalization. The public opinion can , though strikes and demonstrations, impose a lot of things on autocratic regimes, but yawning, distraction, despair and fatalism have become part of the Arab political culture, and imposed a gloomy aura that allows the regimes more space to maneuver. Satellite channels occupied a huge portion of the mind – or of the imagination – and it allows a small slice (a ruling family or two) to control our tastes and our spare times and gives them the power of distracting us away from the liberation of Palestine.
The treaty of Camp David is connected to an American financial and military commitment to the regime in Egypt: It goes beyond the regime of Hosni Mubarak to any other rule that succeeds it – even if was by the Muslim Brotherhood – as long as it respects the Camp David treaty allowing Israel to kill Arabs by the hundreds on other battle fronts even if that meant a convoy in Sudan. The American financial commitments however might be affected in the era of cutting costs even if the American congress, based on the orders of the Israeli lobby, considers the neutralization of Egypt as a top priority in American foreign policy in the Middle East. The neutralization of Egypt saved other millions of dollars that America could have spent in further arming Israel. But there are a lot of variables that might influence the treaty: Sa’ad Hariri’s succession of Rafik Hariri contain positive signals with what pertains to the lack of competence and intelligence in some of the non prodigal sons of the leaders in the Arab World, If Hosni Mubarak uses and fraudulently reiterates talk of the October victory to gain a political legitimacy he does not deserve, where would his son Jamal get credibility and legitimacy from? From Citibank? Or is it that Omar Sulayman will summon Adel Imam to help get Kabob and legitimacy for the American-blessed son?
The Arab-Israeli struggle has gone through many different stops and milestones. Some include setbacks, defeats, tragedies and massacres, but Zionism did not eliminate the Palestinian resistance and the popular Arab rejection of the existence of the Jewish state among us. Camp David is one of the ill-fated milestones that deserve one to stop at with anger and sadness in the same manner as the Belfour promise. But on the other side of Camp David, there are resistances against the Arab regimes and against the Israeli occupation. It is ironic that the Saudi king, when the Thomas Friedman initiative was prepared for him to put if forward in the name of Arabs, has promised a full normalization. Arabs may in the next summit promise Israel to impose absolute allegiance by Arab people in schools, homes and places of work through repeating an oath of absolute obedience to Israel occupation. The senior cleric in Saudi Arabia or Al-Azhar may issue a fatwa making the praise of Israeli and the denouncement of Persians mandatory before eating and after food.
But Camp David did not come out of the blue: it started before it actually happened. Camp David started when the Jordanian King Abdullah sent the first request for a bribe from the Jewish Agency, and in receiving Elias Rababi the first Zionist financing of the Lebanese Phalanges during the parliamentary election in the 50s. But Dalal Al-Moghrabi (and many others) quickly responded to Camp David, before the signing of the treaty and the shaking of the hands."
