I think that Cohen revealed more than he was supposed to, here

"I think we – I was initially simply in favor of either letting the Israelis do it or considering should the United States, itself, consider taking out the reactor. She pushed us in the direction of formulating a rather elaborate diplomatic option, which I drafted, with the help of several senior colleagues at State, which we worked here – which was eventually the State position. But it was a long process of – the President’s eventual decision was let the Israelis do it and if they don’t want to talk about it, we won’t talk about it either. Whether or not that was the right decision, we’ll see. I mean there were – as with most governmental decisions, these are – they’re all 51/49 kinds of decisions and you can’t be entirely sure that they were right ones until a long time after the event.
LAMB: You think there is any residual from that decision for the Israelis to take out that nuclear site.
COHEN: Well, there were a number of consequences that flowed from it. In one way, I think was reassuring for the Israelis in terms of re-establishing some of their credibility after the Lebanon war of 2006, partly because they did it, but also partly because they did it and then were quiet about it and to some extent I think it was a sense of this is how the game is supposed to be played in the Middle East, just do it, you don’t talk about it. So there was that. I have wondered whether it was a good idea for us not to talk about it immediately in order to put the Syrians on the back foot and in order to put pressure on the North Koreans who had behaved extraordinarily badly. I mean it was a debate about that. The Israelis initially did not want this publicized and I think the fear was of it leading to a broader conflict, which I think was a reasonable fear."