Nasrallah and the UNSC 1701: people yesterday disagreed with my assessment on my site (or in conversations) that Hizbullah will accept the lousy UNSC resolution but with reservations. I watched Nasrallah's speech, and it was clear. The Party will accept with reservations the UNSC resolution. As I indicated, Hizbullah's domestic alliances and calculations have been consistently foolish--the best example is their relationship or alliance with Hariri Inc--those who paved the roads for Israel's war of aggression. And this decision is an example. Nasrallah even praised the efforts of the "government"--the same government that has served as the Lebanese element of the international conspiracy against Lebanon. This reminds me of Isma`il Haniyyah when he refers to Abu Mazen as "the brother president Abu Mazen" while this Abu Mazen conspires with Israel against a democratically elected Palestinian government. This UN resolution legitimized Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, and permanently juridically legitimized the violation of Lebanon's sovereignty at least in South Lebanon, but also beyond South Lebanon. The fact that the resolution did not stipulate for a cease-fire is because it was tailored for and on behalf of Israeli occupation and aggression ("Mr. Olmert called President Bush to thank him for his help in "safeguarding Israel'’s interests in the Security Council,"” an Israeli official said.") People may say that Hizbullah is cornered, and that there choices are limited. I disagree. The US government, and Israel, are very dependent on the government of Sanyurah: it serves the purpose that other "Hamid Karzai" governments play in the Middle East. Hizbullah could have easily brought down the government of Sanyurah, and that would have been the biggest pressure on the US and Israel to stop the aggression, knowing how dear Pierre Laval is for the US/Israel. That would have been the strongest political option that Hizbullah had at its disposal, but that it did not exercise. Hizbullah does very well on the battle-field, but typicaly miscalculatestes on the political arena. Israel wanted to extract the kind of political concessions that it was unable to extractact on the battle field. Hizbullah did not know how to take full advantage of its excellent military performance against a clearly bumbling and frightened Israeli army. The very fact that Israel could not even shut off Al-Manar was a clear and important political and propaganda victory for Hizbullah. I mean, people will now have the chance to mock those famous Israeli commando raids: I mean, aside from Hasan Dib Nasrallah, what did those raids achieve? Unless Israel was really eager to kidnap a grocer from Lebanon to train Israeli grocers. But now, Hizbullah will catch its breath, and then it will resume what it does well in Lebanon: procrastination, dissimulation, and national dialogue. Does it make me frustrated to look at the political scene in Lebanon? You bet. There is no one side that deserves support or admiration. And the sacrifices of the people of South Lebanon, in the stiff resistance, in steadfastness and resolve, may have been squandered by Hizbullah by the acceptance of the UNSC resolution. But the notion that Israel or the US will be able to redraw the Lebanese political map is also quite foolish too. If anything, the allies of the US/Israeli agenda in Lebanon are now at a disadvantage, and will be for some time. I now hear Hariri deputies praising the decision of Nasrallah--that confirms my suspicions.