International Crisis Group's Report on Lebanon: Biases and Fu'ad Makhzumi. (Fuad Makhzumi, for potato's sake???). I have just finished reading the new International Crisis Group report on Lebanon. ًWhat can I say? I read Western writings on Lebanon, with very low expectations. But I must say that this report is less bad than other things that I have been reading on Lebanon, in Arabic or in English since the assassination of Hariri. Don't get me wrong: it has its fundamental economic and political biases, and serious questions about documentations and citations. If this was an undergraduate paper, I would first point out the imbalance in the selection of interviews and "documentation" for the report. You clearly see the Western trend of talking to the "usual suspects" in Lebanon. The same people get interviewed over and over again by Western reporters and visitors, which heavily influences the final product in tone and int content and in rumors spread. The only one who is missing from the list of itnerviewees is the late Samir Qasir, but he is dead. Marwan Hamadi, for example, is all over the report, and his footprints are everywhere to see, even when is not quoted by name. There is an unacceptable preponderance of An-Nahar's journalists interviewed, without ever pointing out that none of them, NONE of them, are considered neutral observers in Lebanon. I mean, to report what George Nasif wants or does not want, is not relevant to Lebanon, unless you refer to him as one of the scores of the Hariri pens in Lebanon. There is a clear avoidance of touching the Hariri cult in the report; no mention of the links of Hariri to Syria, and the real origins of his rift with Syria (over Lahhud, not over principles or sovereignty), and no mention to the most crucial role that Hariri played in the disastrous economic policies of Lebanon. Most of sources of the report were either the Hariri gang, or journalists who work for the Hariri gang, assuming that was not known for the ICG. But the ICG should have investigated. The interviews with the "pro-Syrian" groups were rare, and perfunctory. Most of the references to Hizbullah or Amal were based on what was reported on them in Al-Mustaqbal or Daily Star. And there are people in Lebanon who are opposed to Hariri without being lumped into the "pro-Syrian" camp, and they were not interviewed. I can't believe that As-Safir journalists were not mentioned or cited, for example. That is a sign of the weaknesses. And why on earth was Fu'ad Makhzumi (listed as the head of the National Dialogue Party and a "Sunni political leader"--I had to laugh at that one) interviewed? For those who don't know, this guy reportedly and allegedly made money from shady deals and arms sales, and he relocated to Lebanon in the 1990s. Highly ambitious, he clashed with Rafiq Hariri, who had the backing of Syria of course. Discovering the Hariri-Lahhud clash, Makhzumi (who like Hariri used his money to build up a political base) cultivated ties with Lahhud, who loved to support Sunni rivals of Hariri, although this guy never posed a threat to Hariri's Sunni base. A minister in the Lebanese cabinet present in one cabinet meeting told me how Lahhud forced a legalization of Makhzumi's new party at the time. But Makhzumi has no standing whatever. Why was he interviewed? That made me quite suspicious, if you know what I mean. The narrative of the report is interesting and largely devoid of the mistakes and errors that you find in Western writings on Lebanon. But even the narrative, largely follows the general narrative of the Hariri Inc. It does not deviate much from it. To be fair, it mentioned a few things here and there: like the Hariri bailout of the fanatics of the Dinniyyah Group, or the narrow sectarian agitation that characterized Hariri electioneering especially in North Lebanon. But that was about it. But the general orientations of the report follow the line and doctrine of US government, and its triple standards. Look at the recommendations; read even the condensed version in the executive version if the report is too long for you. Hizbullah was asked to refrain from attacking Israel, but Israel was NOT asked to refrain from attacking Lebanon. Does this not betray that famous notion that Arab lives are cheaper than the precious Israeli lives, any harm to which can lead to a convention of a UNSC? And the report often reports rumors or "unconfirmed reports" and then you read the endnote and it is a Hariri source quoted in either the Mehlis report or the UN (read US always) report on Lebanon. And on Shib`a farms. The opinion of Roed-Larson is totally irrelevant from the standpoint of international law. Demarcation of borders is the prerogative of countries sharing borders, and the UN has NO jurisdiction in that regard. When two countries agree on their border's demarcation, they simply deposit the document at the UN. It is a mere depository. It is absolutely bizarre that Larson would have an opinion on where the Lebanese border begins or ends. Could you imagine if a UN official offers an opinion on the border between US and Mexico? And the ICG talks about the overwhelming "international"--read US control over various aspects of Lebanon, and yet concludes that it is largely "positive." Yet, the report itself shows concerns over the level and nature of the intervention. There are some revelation in the report that did not make it in the Lebanese press. That the Lebanese government requested US "help" in planting border signs between Lebanon and Syria. I bet the helpful US will provide help here. Is that not nice? And Hizbullah's enemies and rivals were given ample room to comment and talk about Hizbullah, but no such platform was given to the enemies and rivals of Hariri. And some historical references are, well, outrageous. To talk about Syrian role in the collapse of the May 17 Agreement without any reference to Lebanese opposition to that dreadful agreement is to ignore the entire domestic landscape that was responsible for the construction of an alliance with Syria in order to undermine the May 17 Agreement. The Lebanese opposition to May 17 Agreement facilitated Syrian intervention, and not the other way round. And the report was correct in paying tribute, if that is the right expression, to the sectarian conflict in Lebanon, and its political salience, but it failed to note the extent to which March 14 "Movement" was a thinly disguised sectarian affair. And please, don't repeat the common Lebanoense propaganda line to the effect that the youths of March 14 took to the streets to demand reform and an end to sectarianism. Give me a potato, please. In fact, as people in Lebanon are noticing, the youths of March 14 are more hateful and more sectarian than their leaders sometimes. The best example is the relationship between the `Awn group and the Lebanese Forces. At the leadership level, the relationship is quite good, but at the level of the young masses, clashes, fist-fights, brawls, (and on some occasions gun battles) are not uncommon these days, especially on college campuses. These also are the youth of Lebanon. On the other side, it can't be said that the youth of Hizbullah are not sectarian either. They are of course. As the Arabic proverb says, "as you are, as you are ruled." And the economic recommendations are rather bland, and are not that different from World Bank recipes, and that is perhaps due to the report's excessive reliance on a Hariri economist, Marwan Iskandar. Sometimes you get the impression that the authors of the report did not know who these people are, and could not place them into tapestry--I don't like that word--of the political spectrum of Lebanon. And why did the report not even mention the significance of the million demonstrators on March 8th? Is that because they did not look as elegant as those who elegantly dragged their Sri Lankan maids on March 14th? Or did their beards scare Western reporters, I wonder? And the ICG finds it hard to accept that some "allies of Syria" are very popular in Lebanon, like Elie Skaf or Sulayman Franjiyyah, not to mention others like Amal or Hizbullah or other personalities. And the ICG decided that Hizbullah's campaign (in the last election) was more sectarian than the rest? No, all parties and personalities in Lebanon, except some of those who did not win seats--like the Lebanese Communist Party candidates, ran purely and largely sectarian campaigns. Even the historically secular and non-sectarian President (Lahhud) resorted to sectarian manipulation and dirty tricks to bolster his position against the Hariri Inc. And who told ICG that the demonstrators in Lebanon wanted political reform? Not a single slogan was chanted about political reform. The demonstrators were busy chanting racist slogans against Syrians in Lebanon. The report for some reason did not know that scores of Syrian workers were killed and injured in Lebanon. Mayy Shidyaq was mentioned by name, but she looks more Western, and is not poor like the Syrian workers, and thus deserve a notable mention from ICG. ICG did not interview one Syrian worker in Lebanon, and yet they talked to every Hariri functionary, even when they are of no political significance. A Ghassan `Abdullah, a Palestinian who was formerly with Syrian mukhabarat, and now reportedly works for Hariri mukhabarat was interviewed. And Ibrahim Shams Ad-Din's father was important, but he is NOT. He was interviewed and the footnote elaborated about his father. Ibrahim Shams Ad-Din has been receiving support from Hariri Inc (along with a handful of Hariri Inc-managed Shi`ites) but that effort failed. Shams Ad-Din did very very badly in the Lebanese elections, and has no base whatever. This is an example of the bias of the report. And please, when ICG talks about a the regional and international consensus on Lebanon, it does not mention that the regimes of the region are clients of the US, and that consensus in the era of Empire can be easily manufactured, bullied, bribed, and artificially attained. It is not a spontaneous consensus. And the report mentions, citing the Mehlis report, which cites Hassam Hassam, that Ahmad Jibril had ties to Jamil As-Sayyid. Who did not in Lebanon? Hariri functionaries and the current politicians of Lebanon had better and much closer ties to Jamil As-Sayyid but he does not mention that. And the report avoids any analysis of the construction of the brutal and oppressive Syrian-Lebanese security order, and the role that Rafiq Hariri played. And is it not funny for the report to quote Marwan Hamadi complaining about Syrian control of some ministers when he represents a bloc that was installed by Syrian intelligence? To its credit, the report did at least mention that the Lebanese are not united about Mehlis and his report, and cited polls (reliable) by `Abduh Sa`d. Page 9 mentions US goals in Lebanon, but one of them is listed as the construction of a "democratic model" in Lebanon. I personally don't believe that this is even a remote goal in Lebanon, and if Gen. Ashraf Rifi, hypothetically speaking, seizes powers in a coup, and follows US dictates, he would receive the support and embrace that is received by the Pakistani dictator. And while I don't quibble with the tough tone of Bashshar's speech or of Syrian media, but why would the ICG report not mention the tough AND racist tone of Lebanese Hariri politicians, and of Hariri media? This is another example of political bias that colored the judgment of the report's authors. And references to Palestinians in Lebanon were offensive and rather silly. They are not mentioned or noticed as human beings, but as mere tools of the Syrian government. And references to pictures of `Arafat or of Hamas leaders in the camps are just silly. I don't know what they are supposed to say or mean. And the weird references in the report to a "Zarqawi" network in Lebanon is quite crazy and unsubstantiated. But who is the source on that? A "Lebanese analyst" who lies when he says that there is evidence of increasing recruitment of Lebanese by Zarqawi. No evidence of that whatever. You may look at a post from two days ago on that. This, in the context of the report, sounds like yet another Hariri journalist in An-Nahar. And when I read ICG relying on the "insights" of Nabil BuMunsif (a notorious rapid sectarian Christian agitator/columnist at An-Nahar) I understand some of the biases of the report. And why would the report rely on the Israeli account of the recent clash in Shib`ah farms? Inquiring minds want to know.
PS. Yes, I know. It was pointed out to me that Qasir was interviewed, but early in the process of the preparation, i.e. before he died. And yes, references were made to As-Safir here and there, but AnNahar ruled supreme in the report.